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Due Process. Equal Protection of the Laws. Commerce Among
the Several States. The words and phrases of the Constitution that
produce most interpretive disagreements are very old. Many, such as
the Presentment Clause and the Vesting Clauses, can be found in the
Constitution as it existed in 1793. Others, including the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, were added to the Constitution immediately after the
Civil War. None of these clauses has changed since the day it was rati-
fied.
No similar stability has attended the Supreme Court’s under-
standing of what these clauses mean. Sometimes the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment has meant that states must make rea-
sonable accommodations for religious practices in administering fa-
cially neutral laws, while at other times it has meant that states need
not do so.1 Sometimes the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has meant that Congress has special leeway in crafting
programs designed to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination,
while at other times it has meant that Congress has no more leeway
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1. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408–09 (1963) (holding that a neutral, gen-
erally applicable state law barring unemployment compensation to individuals who did not ac-
cept suitable work when offered could not be applied to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused
to work on Saturdays for religious reasons), with Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990) (holding that a neutral, generally applicable state law crimi-
nalizing drug use could be applied to Native Americans who used peyote in a religious cere-
mony).
SCHROEDER.DOC 02/07/02 11:44 AM
308 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:307
than the states.2 Sometimes the Tenth Amendment has meant that the
states are protected from federal wage and hour standards, while at
other times it has not.3 Moreover, when the Constitution has not pro-
tected states from the application of federal wage and hour standards,
sometimes sovereign immunity has protected the states from em-
ployee lawsuits complaining of the violation of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, while at other times it has not.4 And so on.
Such shifts in meaning have become part and parcel of contem-
porary history. The Supreme Court’s recent interpretive changes vary
in magnitude, but cumulatively they leave little doubt that the
Rehnquist Court reads the Constitution in ways markedly different
from the Warren Court. Of course, all these changes have generated
considerable debate over whether the new meanings are better than
the old. These shifts in meaning also have brought renewed interest in
the question of constitutional change. What best explains why inter-
pretive positions change? What do these changes say about the nature
of legal reasoning? This Essay explores the issue of constitutional
change with respect to one major class of changes: those introduced
by the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence.
I.  THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT
A. Recent Doctrinal Changes
In the recent past, the Court interpreted the Constitution to pro-
tect a woman’s right to choose,5 to grant Congress broad powers un-
2. Compare Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1990) (applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny to minority preference policies at the Federal Communications Commission), with
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223–24 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a
federal set-aside program for minority contractors).
3. Compare Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (finding that the
minimum wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to employees of
state and local governments were unconstitutional), with Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195–
96 (1968) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state-operated schools and hos-
pitals), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (overruling
Usery and upholding the minimum wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as
applied to a municipal transit authority).
4. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 739–40 (1999) (holding that a state could not be sued
in either federal or state court for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act unless it had
waived sovereign immunity, even though the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to state employ-
ees).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (ruling that a patient can obtain an abortion
without interference from states before the fetus is viable).
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der the Commerce Clause to regulate and criminalize intrastate ac-
tivities,6 to authorize congressional abrogation of state sovereign im-
munity pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause powers,7 and to
recognize a distinction between discrimination designed to ameliorate
the effects of prior invidious discrimination and invidious discrimina-
tion itself.8
Today, all these doctrines have been overruled or noticeably al-
tered,9 with the exception of the “essential holding” of Roe v. Wade.
Even that counterexample attests to a sea change in the Court’s ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation. To affirm Roe, the extraordi-
nary joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey10 relied heavily on
stare decisis, rather than on a straightforward reassertion of Roe’s
reasoning.11 Casey thus was a case in which dispositional conservatism
prevailed over a more ideologically aggressive brand, not a case in
6. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152–53 (1971) (finding that “extortionate
credit transactions” were among the class of activities Congress could regulate in the absence of
particular proof that the activity affects interstate commerce).
7. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (determining that “the
special nature of the power conferred” by the Commerce Clause allows Congress to supersede
state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause). Under current
interpretations, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity when enforcing provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but not when exercising its Commerce Clause powers. Alden, 527
U.S. at 733.
8. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (upholding an order invalidating the special admissions program at the University of
California, Davis, School of Medicine). In Bakke, a fractured decision in which the Justices split
4-1-4, Justice Powell (writing alone) announced the judgment of the Court. Justice Powell wrote
that some preference for race is acceptable in higher education because diversity constitutes a
compelling state interest. Id. at 314–15. Justice Brennan’s opinion for four of the Justices stated
that affirmative action in medical school admissions does not stigmatize and that affirmative
action is justified when it redresses past discrimination. Id. at 360–62.
9. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (limiting Congress’s powers under
the Commerce Clause to regulate and criminalize intrastate activities); Alden, 527 U.S. at 739–
40 (limiting congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce
Clause); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (invalidating, on Due
Process Clause grounds, a plan intended to remedy discrimination because the plan was not
linked to identified discrimination). For a discussion of other doctrines that have changed, see
supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. Id. at 853 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion):
While we appreciate the weight of the arguments made on behalf of the State in the
cases before us, arguments which in their ultimate formulation conclude that Roe
should be overruled, the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central
holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given
combined with the force of stare decisis.
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which the constitutional philosophy of the Warren Court’s opinion
continued to attract majority support on its own.12
Many of the opinions signaling doctrinal change have been 5-4 or
6-3 decisions.13 These splits often are interpreted as occurring along a
liberal to conservative continuum, and as signifying that the Court is
just as divided as (and perhaps even more divided than) the Court of
thirty years ago.14 Neither the apparent continuation of a lib-
eral/conservative division nor the closeness of many of the Court’s
opinions ought to mask the fact that the Court as a whole is a very
different body from the Court of thirty years ago. The center of grav-
ity of the issues the Court takes up with its discretionary jurisdiction
has shifted toward the conservative end of the spectrum. The cutting-
edge questions that confronted the Warren Court probed the limits of
an expanding set of civil liberties,15 of the power of citizens to chal-
lenge actions of their government,16 and of the federal government’s
nearly total authority to establish national policies.17 In contrast, con-
temporary cutting-edge decisions test how far protections for civil
12. See Christopher H. Schroeder, A Conservative Court? Yes, 1993 PUB. INT. L. REV. 127,
130–146 (discussing three types of conservatism evident in recent Court decisions: judicial role
conservatism, a desire not to upset majoritarian decisions; ideological conservatism, a desire to
implement a particular conservative ideology of limited government, a greater role for religion
in public life, and a strong executive; and dispositional conservatism, a desire to respect existing
practices and to avoid decisions based on abstract rules). Casey represented a triumph of dispo-
sitional conservatism over the other two forms. Id. at 142.
13. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 739–40 (5-4 decision); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (5-4 decision);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (6-3 decision).
14. See Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Divided They Stand, The High Court and The
Triumph of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 4, at 1 (stating that the 2000 Term saw one-
third of the Court’s seventy-nine cases decided by 5-4 votes, a “higher proportion than any time
in memory”); Charles Lane & Amy Goldstein, At High Court, a Retirement Watch, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2001, at A4 (describing the Court as divided along liberal and conservative lines
and discussing the increasing likelihood that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor will
retire).
15. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a law that for-
bade the use of contraceptives).
16. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (upholding a taxpayer’s standing to
challenge federal subsidies to parochial schools under the Establishment Clause).
17. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195–96 (1968) (holding that the “enterprise
concept” of the Fair Labor Standards Act was constitutionally valid under the Commerce
Clause).
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liberties should be narrowed,18 standing restricted,19 and federal
authority limited.20
This reorientation has been under way for a number of years,
notwithstanding the fact that the developments of the past decade
have attracted the most attention. While the Burger Court has been
described as the “counter-revolution that wasn’t,”21 that Court effec-
tively halted the extension of many Warren Court precedents. The
Burger Court may not have marched off in new directions, but its lack
of enthusiasm for Warren Court precedent helped prepare the way
for the Rehnquist Court’s interpretive shift. The result is that in most
areas of constitutional jurisprudence today, the vectors of jurisgenera-
tive energy point in directions that lead to conservative results, not
liberal ones. Put in political science terms, the core constituencies of
the Court have changed in the last three decades. They have shifted
18. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986) (ruling that there is no pri-
vacy right protecting consensual acts of homosexual sex in a private home).
19. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (denying standing to
plaintiffs challenging land-use decisions by a federal agency because the plaintiffs had not al-
leged with sufficient specificity that they used the particular lands affected).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (limiting Congress’s powers
under the Commerce Clause to regulate and criminalize intrastate activities). The contrast be-
tween the present Court and the 1970s Court is starkly illustrated by San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Rodriguez Court came within one vote of
affirming a district court decision finding wealth a suspect classification and education a funda-
mental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis. Id. at 62–133. Advocates of more equi-
table public school financing—and of more aggressive equal protection review of state and local
laws—had viewed their chances in the Supreme Court with some optimism. Part of the reason
for their optimism was a California state court decision, Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.
1971), rendered two years prior to Rodriguez. The Serrano court concluded that the plaintiffs’
complaint adequately alleged that California’s public school financing system touched upon a
fundamental interest and that a student’s entitlement to this fundamental interest was condi-
tioned upon wealth. Id. at 1263. The court held that the California public school financing sys-
tem would not withstand strict scrutiny if the plaintiffs could prove the allegations contained in
their complaint. Id. Earlier Warren Court decisions seemed to suggest that the Supreme Court
might view a similar challenge favorably. See Judith Areen & Leonard Ross, The Rodriguez
Case: Judicial Oversight of School Finance, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 33 (observing that conserva-
tive scholar Philip Kurland had “noted (and deplored) . . . [that] the ‘activist’ decisions of the
Warren Court provided the straight edge and compass for the logical construction of an argu-
ment for court-ordered reform of school finance—in Kurland’s words, ‘the easy case for equal
educational opportunity’”). Today, it is unlikely that anyone supporting such an agenda would
seek to litigate in the Supreme Court.
21. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983).
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from labor unions, minorities, and women to a “well-to-do constitu-
ency.”22
The shift can be detected in attorneys’ litigation strategies. Sup-
porters of legal positions drawn from Warren Court precedent are
reluctant to bring cases that might call those precedents into ques-
tion.23 In their place, those pursuing an agenda of undoing Warren
Court precedents—by restricting federal power, by dismantling af-
firmative action programs, and by championing state autonomy—are
eager to bring cases.
The conservative potential of the Rehnquist Court is not always
fully realized. Such was the case in Casey, Dickerson,24 and Laidlaw.25
Nonetheless, such setbacks cannot hide the fact that the Court has
staked out positions on a number of questions that are quite distinct
from Warren Court precedent, nor can they hide the fact that liberal
theories of constitutionalism are generally on the defensive for their
inability to explain or justify Supreme Court decisions.
But how are scholars to characterize the current constitutional
moment? Some commentators have ascribed an almost unprece-
dented significance to these doctrinal shifts. In this spirit, Michael
Gerhardt writes that the Court’s recent federalism decisions are of
“historic proportions,” creating a tension between Congress and the
Court unseen since the Lochner era.26 New York Times Supreme
Court reporter Linda Greenhouse sees a “revolution” occurring on
22. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword: The New Constitutional
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 66 (1999). Were
the most conservative implications of the Court’s recent doctrine to gain the support of a ma-
jority of Justices, the Court’s core constituency would shift to encompass even more social con-
servatives.
23. Sometimes plaintiffs who support progressive positions are placed in situations where
they have no realistic alternatives. Such was the case when the University of Texas lost the
Hopwood decision in the Fifth Circuit, which invalidated the university’s affirmative action pro-
gram in admissions. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Thurgood
Marshall Legal Soc’y v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (2001). Texas’s program was similar to other
programs established at universities throughout the country permitting the use of race as a crite-
rion in admissions.
24. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (reaffirming the rule of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which held that a confession is inadmissible unless the defendant
received a prior warning informing him of his constitutional rights).
25. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183–84
(2000) (granting standing under the Clean Water Act to plaintiffs who used waterways down-
stream of a discharging facility and who cut back on that use because of their concerns that the
water was polluted).
26. Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Regulation in a Post-Lopez World: Some Questions and
Answers, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,980, 10,980 (2000).
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the Court.27 Former United States Solicitor General Seth Waxman ar-
gues that “constitutional adjudication has undergone a thoroughgoing
paradigm shift.”28 Others see a distinct change, but a change that has
already worked its most dramatic departures from the past. Mark
Tushnet, for example, writes that although we are in a “new constitu-
tional order,” it is an order within which the current Court “will un-
dertake no dramatic initiatives” nor effectuate many “dramatic re-
trenchments on established doctrine.”29 In keeping with Tushnet’s
assessment, Frederick P. Lewis argues that core Warren Court deci-
sions will remain intact because contemporary society finds them to
be highly functional.30 Others take issue with the argument that the
present is so sharply distinguishable from the past. Kathleen Sullivan
thus finds this Court “not easy to classify,” noting that in many areas
of its jurisprudence, the Court has issued opinions better described as
liberal than conservative, and that majorities in divided cases can be
composed of members of the liberal and the conservative wings.31
The entire corpus of Supreme Court decisions indeed may be too
diffuse for easy characterization as liberal or conservative. Even if
every doctrinal dispute could be described as occurring along a single
liberal-conservative dimension, it is questionable whether this dimen-
sion can be described the same way in all disputes. It thus seems im-
probable that all disputes can be seen as specific instances of a global
struggle between liberalism and conservatism. There is one area of
constitutional dispute, however, where the nature of the doctrinal
shift, if not its magnitude, has come into sharp focus. That area in-
volves questions of federalism.
New York v. United States32 first signaled the Court’s shift toward
increased protection for the states.33 In the subsequent Brady Act liti-
27. Greenhouse, supra note 14, § 4, at 1 (“There is a revolution in progress at the court,
with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas challenging long-settled doctrines governing state-
federal relations, the separation of powers, property rights and religion.”).
28. Seth Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1075–76 (2001).
29. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 64.
30. FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE OF
THE WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 125–28 (1999).
31. Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Court Not Easy to Classify, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A31.
32. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
33. Id. at 149 (holding that Congress may use incentives to encourage the states to dispose
of the radioactive waste within their borders, but that Congress may not compel the states to do
so). Although Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York was anticipated by her earlier concur-
rence in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775–97 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dis-
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gation, the Court further solidified state protection under the Tenth
Amendment.34 The Court also has protected state prerogatives by
limiting the scope of powers assigned to the federal government.
United States v. Lopez35 held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 had gone beyond the reach of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers.36 United States v. Morrison37 clarified and tightened the consti-
tutional limitations on those powers.38 City of Boerne v. Flores39 im-
posed a proportionality restriction on Congress’s powers under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents41 then held that federal legislation to eliminate workplace dis-
crimination against the elderly was not “appropriate legislation” un-
der that Amendment, and therefore could not be applied against the
states by their employees.42 Seminole Tribe v. Florida43 and Alden v.
Maine44 found a residual concept of state sovereignty to be an implicit
limitation on federal authority, protecting state autonomy far more
robustly than the Eleventh Amendment’s text might suggest.45 Indica-
senting in part), New York was the first decision in which her federalism views commanded a
majority.
34. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–12 (1997) (ruling that Congress did not have
the constitutional authority to impress either the state executive or the state legislature into its
service).
35. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36. Id. at 567–68.
37. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38. See id. at 617 (barring Congress from regulating “noneconomic, violent criminal con-
duct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce”).
39. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
40. Id. at 533–34 (stating that the demands that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
made of state laws “reflect[ed] a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means
adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved”).
41. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
42. Id. at 91 (stating that because Congress failed to identify a pervasive pattern of age dis-
crimination by the states, Congress had no reason to believe the “indiscriminate scope” of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 was necessary). The Court extended the
Boerne-Kimel line by holding that Congress could not subject the states to suit for violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. 356, 121
S. Ct. 955, 960 (2001).
43. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
44. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
45. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68 (holding that the Constitution, in its grant of federal ju-
dicial power, “‘does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against
a State without consent given’” (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921))); Alden,
527 U.S. at 713 (concluding that while the Constitution creates a national government with
broad authority, the “founding document” also expressly acknowledges the sovereignty of
states).
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tive of the centrality of these federalism decisions to the overall image
of the current Court, scholars often refer to the present period as the
Lopez or post-Lopez era.46 And except for New York v. United States,
all of the federalism cases have been decided by an identical five-
Justice majority comprised of the conservative wing of the Court:
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.
B. Gauging the Magnitude of the Federalism Decision Changes
To shed some light on whether the federalism decisions are of
historic proportions, we can utilize the distinction between revolu-
tionary and nonrevolutionary constitutional change proposed by
Bruce Ackerman.47 Ackerman’s work on non–Article V constitutional
amendments has been motivated in part by an interest in explaining
how changes in constitutional interpretation can be both discontinu-
ous with past interpretations, as judged by fair-minded application of
the standard lawyers’ tools of interpretation, yet also legitimate, de-
spite the absence of formal amendment to the text of the Constitution
itself.48 Ackerman argues that for such discontinuous, or revolution-
ary, constitutional change to be legitimate, it needs to have proceeded
through four distinct steps: signaling the existence of a significant
constitutional dispute, proposing a change in constitutional meaning,
mobilizing popular deliberation concerning the desirability of change
and, finally, codifying the change through acceptance by public offi-
cials, including acceptance in Supreme Court doctrine.49
46. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1919 (1995) (referring to the “post-Lopez era”); George D. Brown, Should Federal-
ism Shield Corruption?—Mail Fraud, State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
225, 280 (1997) (referring to the “[p]ost-Lopez era”); Gerhardt, supra note 26, at 10,980 (refer-
ring to the “[p]ost-Lopez era”); Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for
Jot” Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1112 (1998) (referring to the
“Lopez era”); Erik R. Neusch, Medical Marijuana’s Fate in the Aftermath of the Supreme
Court’s New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 201, 239 (2001) (referring to
the “pre-Lopez era”); Rachel Elizabeth Smith, United States v. Lopez: Reaffirming the Federal
Commerce Power and Remembering Federalism, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1459, 1490 n.178 (1996)
(referring to the “post-Lopez era”).
47. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 19 (1991) (characterizing cer-
tain periods of constitutional history as involving “revolutionary reform” unlike periods of nor-
mal lawmaking).
48. Id. at 267–68 (contrasting the “classical” system of constitutional amendment through
Article V of the Constitution with the “modern” system of constitutional amendment through
the four steps of signaling, proposing, deliberating, and codifying for legitimacy).
49. Id. at 269–90 (describing the four steps).
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Ackerman further suggests that observers can identify when
revolutionary change has occurred, and, hence, when some version of
the four-step process is necessary to legitimize that change, by em-
ploying a thought experiment to test whether observed changes might
be explicable simply by application of legal reasoning. The thought
experiment involves a “ten-year test.”50 As applied to the recent fed-
eralism changes, the experiment is this: Imagine traveling backward
through time to 1990. Ask a thoughtful constitutional lawyer of that
day to look forward a decade and “speculate about the likely paths
that [federalism doctrine] might take if it proceeded along an evolu-
tionary course—one small step at a time.”51 Then return to the pres-
ent, and “consider whether existing [federalism] doctrines actually
remain within this evolutionary envelope of possibility. If they do,
you have witnessed a decade of normal evolutionary development;
but if they have moved far beyond the envelope on many doctrinal
fronts, there has been a juridical revolution . . . .”52
The results of this thought experiment when applied to the fed-
eralism decisions are quite contestable.53 This should not be surpris-
ing. People can disagree over results of the thought experiment even
when it is applied to decades that present much stronger evidence of
revolutionary change. For comparison with the current period, con-
sider the 1930s. That decade ought to be an easy case; in fact, it con-
stitutes one of the three revolutionary constitutional moments Profes-
sor Ackerman identifies.54 While most people would concede that the
jurisprudential changes that occurred in the 1930s satisfied the ten-
year test, some revisionists have argued persuasively that the “switch
50. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2287 (1999).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The ten-year test contains a number of ambiguities this Essay does not attempt to re-
solve. Along how many doctrinal fronts must decisions shift outside the “evolutionary enve-
lope” to qualify as “many”? Federalism, for instance, might be one doctrinal front, or it might
be several: the doctrines of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Tenth Amendment,
of the Eleventh Amendment, and of the Commerce Clause. Would movement on these four
areas constitute movement on “many” fronts? How do you measure whether a doctrine has
moved “far beyond” normal evolutionary development? The recent federalism cases strike a
tone quite different than those of thirty years ago, but so far they have not affected the federal
government’s ability to execute policy like the 1930s Court’s rejection of the First New Deal did.
54. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 47–50 (stating that the New Deal amounted to a “suc-
cessful struggle . . . to place activist national government on solid constitutional foundation,”
and that the “Supreme Court repudiated its doctrinal defense of laissez-faire capitalism and be-
gan to build new constitutional foundations for activist national government”).
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in time” that marked the change in the New Deal Court was within
the evolutionary envelope of such cases as Nebbia v. New York.55
The revisionist account of the 1930s has not yet carried the day in
recharacterizing the 1930s as a period of merely evolutionary change.
The case in favor of the revolutionary interpretation remains the
more convincing.56 Our 1990s thought experiment, however, suggests
that the recent turn in constitutional interpretation is not nearly as
sharp as the turn taken by the 1930s Court. Some of the recent
changes quite arguably fit within the evolutionary envelope as viewed
from 1990. In particular, the holding in New York v. United States on
the scope of the Tenth Amendment may have been fairly anticipated
after FERC v. Mississippi57 (and even more so after Gregory v. Ash-
croft).58 On the other hand, other features of the emerging federalism
doctrines would have been harder to anticipate. For instance, few
would have predicted that the Court might uncover the nontextual re-
sidual notion of sovereignty that grounds the results in Seminole
Tribe59 and Alden. To reach those results, the Court had to overrule
its newly minted 1989 decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.60
Still other decisions of the 1990s also may have been outside the evo-
55. 291 U.S. 502 (1934); see, e.g, BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:
THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 7 (1998) (“[W]hen the Court aban-
doned the old public/private distinction in Nebbia, then, it pulled a particularly important thread
from [an interwoven] fabric [of constitutional doctrine].”); Richard D. Friedman, Switching
Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1922 (1994) (stating that Nebbia represented “a reaffirmation of the
more liberal direction” the Court was taking in “its emphasis on the susceptibility to control for
the public good of what had previously been deemed private”). For further discussion, see infra
note 116 and accompanying text.
56. For an analysis and critique of this revisionism, see generally David A. Pepper, Against
Legalism: Rebutting an Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 63 (1998).
57. 456 U.S. 742, 775–97 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also supra note 33.
58. 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (finding that in enacting the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 Congress did not intend to usurp the traditional state power to determine the
necessary credentials of its officers); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Congress exceeded its spending power because the
condition it placed on spending was not “reasonably related to the expenditure of federal
funds”).
59.  Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). If reversing a decision that was just rendered fell within plausible
evolutionary expectations, then it seems that few, if any, changes could be judged outside the
evolutionary envelope.
60. 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (holding that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the author-
ity to supercede state sovereign immunity since the power to regulate interstate commerce
“would be incomplete without the authority to render states liable in damages”).
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lutionary envelope. For example, although scholars had noted for
years that the Court’s post-Lochner interpretation of the Commerce
Clause put almost no action beyond Congress’s power, a number of
them also had suggested that this interpretation was in tension with
the Framers’ understanding.61 So the invocation of some limitation on
Commerce Clause authority might have been a possibility in 1990.
Nonetheless, nothing in the Court’s opinions prior to Lopez pointed
to the specific distinction the Court has erected to police those Com-
merce Clause boundaries.62
The results of the thought experiment are further complicated
because the conditions under which the experiment should be con-
ducted have not been specified fully. The course of jurisprudential
development can be affected by strategic actions that influence who
becomes a Supreme Court Justice.63 Because of this, the shape of the
evolutionary envelope ten years in the future will depend upon
whether the president has taken successful strategic steps.
In particular, efforts to affect the Court through strategic ap-
pointments were part of the historical backdrop leading up to the
changes of the 1990s. For several decades, conservatives had worked
hard to create conditions favorable to achieving results like those in
Lopez and Printz. Through organs such as the Federalist Society, the
Cato Institute, various conservative public interest litigation centers
and legal journals, conservatives made the case for Commerce Clause
limitations and respect for state autonomy.64 In the Reagan-Bush
years, Justice Department lawyers worked on a self-styled Federalist
61. Compare LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816 (3d ed. 2000)
(citing a combination of doctrines operating in the 1937–95 period that made “striking down a
congressional attempt to invoke the commerce power as outside the affirmative scope of that
power . . . a de facto impossibility”), with CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29 (1970) (arguing that a proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause
would find judicially enforceable limits to the scope of the commerce power).
62. See TRIBE, supra note 61, at 819–22 (describing the Court’s approach in Lopez as con-
stituting a “new focus on ‘economic’ activity” the Court justified by a “post-hoc reconfigura-
tion” of prior cases).
63. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
64. Douglas Kendall and Charles Lord describe conservative organizations’ efforts to re-
shape the federal judiciary. Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Criti-
cal Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 530–49
(1998) (describing the judicial selection process and the role of the Federalist Society and other
conservative legal organizations in the Reagan administration and beyond). Kendall and Lord
focus on the Fifth Amendment’s protections for private property. Conservatives also sought to
alter Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See infra note 65.
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Project designed to bring about even bolder shifts in doctrine than the
shift in Lopez.65
Such strategic activity is to be expected. As Professor Ackerman
notes, “Really big constitutional changes do not generally occur in
such a short time without lots of people setting their sights on some
big ideas, and working hard and long to make them into realities
(though, of course, the actual results may well fall short of activists’
dreams).”66 For purposes of the thought experiment, though, the exis-
tence of strategic players confounds the results. If strategic efforts to
change the Court through appointments are properly considered in
projecting doctrinal developments ten years hence, then the range of
possibilities can expand considerably, and truly major doctrinal
changes can fail to count as revolutionary or discontinuous transi-
tions.
Ackerman might sidestep these complications in the present set-
ting, because under his interpretation of the ten-year test, very few
decades qualify as revolutionary. The changes that he recognizes as
revolutionary—the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal—all
“inaugurate[d] . . . sweeping transformation[s].”67 The last of these he
describes as a “root-and-branch repudiation of the leading precedents
of the Lochner era.”68 It amounted to more than just doctrinal change;
it constituted a “self-conscious juridical reconstruction of framework
values . . . . [which is] the hallmark of doctrinal revolutions.”69 These
are characterizations of legal upheaval that cannot be applied to
many ten-year periods, and certainly not to our present circumstances
(at least thus far).
Regardless of whether Ackerman would describe the recent fed-
eralism decisions as revolutionary,70 some observers might describe
65. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 182–88 (1991) (describing the efforts of Federalist Society members and
others in the Reagan Justice Department to limit government power, including “[seeking] every
possible way to redress the balance of power between the federal and local governments, which
had shifted in the last half-century to favor the national government overwhelmingly”).
66. Ackerman, supra note 50, at 2288.
67. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 77.
68. Id.
69. Ackerman, supra note 50, at 2334.
70. Professor Ackerman has stated that the Rehnquist Court’s recent federalism cases lie
outside the evolutionary envelope fairly anticipated in 1990. E-mail from Bruce Ackerman,
Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School, to Christopher H. Schroeder,
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Aug. 24, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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them as such.71 If this is a period of revolutionary change, however, it
is also a period in which government actors have not marched down
the four-step path to legitimacy. This is true even assuming for the
sake of argument that the signaling and proposing steps in Acker-
man’s four-step process were achieved when the national Republican
leadership embraced a conservative agenda in the 1994 Contract with
America.72 Scholars have not seen anything approaching the kind of
broad and sustained public deliberation over basic changes in our
constitutional structure contemplated by the third step—mobilized
public deliberation about the desirability of constitutional change.
Candidates made practically no mention of the need for constitu-
tional change in the 1994 election campaign,73 and surveys show that
71. An interesting indicator that the changes of the 1990s were discontinuous with prior
decisions is the fact that in 1999–2000 the Department of Justice notified the Congress twelve
times that it could not defend the constitutionality of specific statutory provisions. Waxman, su-
pra note 28, at 1086. The Solicitor General has a general obligation to defend any Act of Con-
gress, and he or she will take the extreme step of not defending a statute only when he or she
concludes that no respectable argument can be made on the statute’s behalf. There is no ques-
tion that the Department of Justice would have been prepared to defend each of these statutes
in, say, 1991. There is no indication that Congress thought any of these laws to be so obviously
unconstitutional when enacted that no plausible defense existed for them. The declination let-
ters, then, seem to support the view that both the Executive and the Congress find the changes
in constitutional doctrine to be discontinuous with the immediate past.
72. More than three hundred House candidates endorsed the Contract with America prior
to the 1994 elections. See infra note 73. These candidates committed themselves to the Con-
tract’s ten-item platform, which the Republican leadership of the 104th Congress then pursued.
Representative Bono summarized the Contract’s terms:
No. 1, a balanced budget amendment and line-item veto;
No. 2, a new crime bill to stop violent criminals;
No. 3, welfare reform to encourage work, not dependence;
No. 4, family reinforcement to crack down on deadbeat dads and protect our children;
No. 5, tax cuts for families to lift Government’s burden from middle-income Ameri-
cans;
No. 6, national security restoration to protect our freedom;
No. 7, Senior Citizens’ Equity Act to allow our seniors to work without Government
penalty;
No. 8, Government regulation and unfunded mandate reforms;
No. 9, commonsense legal reform to end frivolous lawsuits; and
No. 10, Congressional term limits to make Congress a citizen legislature.
141 CONG. REC. 2476 (1995) (Statement of Rep. Bono (R–CA)).
73. The Contract with America was not silent on constitutional reform, but none of its pro-
posals would have altered the Constitution’s basic allocation of decisionmaking authority be-
tween the federal government and the states. As reflected in public opinion polling, the Con-
tract’s most popular proposal was a constitutional amendment that would have prohibited
deficit spending. John B. Bader, The Contract with America: Origins and Assessments, in
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most Americans were completely unaware of the Contract with
America on election day in 1994.74
No shift in federalism doctrines has been fully codified, either.
This last step in Ackerman’s model requires a constitutional impasse
followed by decisive and consolidating elections in which constitu-
tional stakes play a significant role in electoral politics and in which
the champions of revolutionary change prevail.75 Whatever the politi-
cal climate in 1994, the elections of 1996 and 1998 failed to consoli-
date the most conservative components of the Republican agenda.76
The size of the Republican majority in the House was reduced in the
elections of 1996 and 1998.77 The 1996 election in particular is more
convincingly understood as a repudiation of Republican efforts to
dismantle the federal government’s regulatory apparatus than as an
affirmation of those efforts.78 Ever since the 1996 election, Republi-
cans have sought deregulatory objectives in less visible ways than the
bold strokes of the Contract with America, thus taking Senator
McCain’s advice to trade in the “meat ax” for the “scalpel.”79 Con-
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 347, 356 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 6th ed.
1997). The second most popular proposal, which would have limited lawmakers’ terms in office,
also would have required a constitutional amendment. Id. No complaints against the existing
constitutional structure as it relates to federalism were voiced in the Contract, and no constitu-
tional amendments germane to federalism were proposed. The remaining items were popular
policy initiatives—cutting taxes, strengthening the military, fighting crime, and so forth—that
contemplated congressional action. Id. at 357 (presenting a table that identifies the Contract’s
goals and central issues). While devolution-enhancing measures were part of this package, the
actions promised all could take place within the existing constitutional framework.
74. See, e.g., Editorial, End of the Beginning, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 10, 1995, available at
1995 WL 5399780 (“[I]f recent polls are to be believed, the bulk of the population doesn’t even
know of the contract’s existence. And among those who know of it, approval of its provisions is
far from unanimous.”).
75. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 288–90.
76. Indeed, the elections in 1996, 1998, and 2000 have been so close that no consolidation
currently exists around any political agenda. See, e.g., PAUL R. ABRAMSON ET AL., CHANGE
AND CONTINUITY IN THE 1996 AND 1998 ELECTIONS 282 (1999) (“After the 1996 and 1998 elec-
tions there appeared to be no clear majority party in the United States . . . .”).
77. The Republicans lost nine seats in the House of Representatives in the 1996 elections
and another five seats in 1998. Id. at 191, 194.
78. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach
of) the Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental
Protection?, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 1996, at 9 (analyzing the reform proposals of Con-
tract with America supporters as seen in their understanding of environmental regulation).
79. John McCain, Editorial, Nature Is Not a Liberal Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996, at
A31 (arguing that, by showing themselves “too eager to swing the meat ax of repeal when the
scalpel of reform is what’s needed,” House Republicans, leading up to the 1996 elections, had
succeeded in making their stewardship of the environment “the voters’ number-one concern
about continued Republican leadership of Congress”).
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gressional Republicans were nearly invisible on the national stage
during the election, and George W. Bush’s emphasis on “compas-
sionate conservatism” prevented the narrow Republican victories of
2000 from being the kind of decisive election necessary to codify a
revolutionary change. In any event, an election placing the loser of
the popular vote in the White House hardly could be considered a
consolidating election.
One interpretation of the past decade, then, would suggest that
the nation has experienced revolutionary change without having ex-
perienced the procedural steps necessary to legitimate such change. If
revolutionary constitutional change has occurred, and if that change is
legitimate, one must conclude that as a descriptive matter Acker-
man’s model is incomplete. There must be a causal process at work
that is materially different from the one Ackerman posits.
An alternative interpretation of the past decade is that the
changes that have occurred are not revolutionary, but are nonetheless
significant enough to have attracted considerable attention. Even un-
der this more modest evaluation, one is left to wonder what has
caused these changes at this point in the country’s development.
Under either interpretation, then, something interesting has been
taking place at the Supreme Court, and no one yet has offered a con-
vincing explanation for it. The remainder of this Essay supplies a
causal account of the changes that have occurred in the federalism
cases.
II.  EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EXPLANATIONS FOR
LEGAL CHANGE
The most obvious starting point for thinking about the causes
of these legal changes is the shifting composition of the Court. In
the last seventeen years a succession of appointments has replaced
more liberal Justices with more conservative ones. Beginning in
1984, Antonin Scalia replaced Warren Burger, Anthony Kennedy re-
placed Lewis Powell, David Souter replaced William Brennan, and
Clarence Thomas replaced Thurgood Marshall.80 As a result, the
80. President Bill Clinton’s two appointees, Ruth Bader Ginsburg (replacing Byron White)
and Stephen Breyer (replacing Harry Blackmun), were not radically more conservative than
their predecessors. Breyer may be somewhat more conservative than Blackmun, but he and
Ginsburg (who is more liberal than White) form part of the liberal wing of the current Court.
Were their constitutional views to hold the majority, none of the revolutionary federalism rul-
ings would have been made.
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Court has a more conservative center of gravity than it has in some
time.81
These appointments were the product of a Republican strategy
to stock the Court with conservatives.82 Some observers reject the
idea that presidents will succeed in implementing judicial selection
strategies.83 They can point to examples of presidents whose efforts to
shape the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence have been thwarted by the
positions ultimately taken by their appointees.84 Notable instances of
such surprises include President Dwight Eisenhower and Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren, President Richard Nixon and Justice Harry Black-
mun, and President George Bush and Justice David Souter. These
surprises underscore a vision of a Court above politics by showing
that presidents, even if they want to, cannot implement a political
agenda through judicial appointments. Life tenure means that Jus-
tices will be their own people, and who those people will turn out to
be is unpredictable. This claim of unpredictability contributes to the
81. But for the failure of Judge Robert Bork’s nomination, the Court might be even more
conservative. Without that defeat, the three Justices appointed after Scalia could well have been
Robert Bork, Douglas Ginsburg, and Clarence Thomas. Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was nearly nominated to fill Justice Powell’s seat
after the Senate defeated Judge Bork’s nomination to fill that vacancy. But Judge Ginsburg
withdrew from consideration after stories arose of his past marijuana use while a law professor
at Harvard. See MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE 312–16 (1992). Had Bork been
confirmed, the intense media scrutiny of Ginsburg, which uncovered his marijuana use, would
not have been as intense. Senator Orrin Hatch, a member of the Judiciary Committee at the
time, thought that Ginsburg would have been confirmed even in the immediate aftermath of the
Bork bitterness. The Reagan administration, however, was unwilling to risk a second defeat.
After Ginsburg’s withdrawal, Reagan nominated then-Judge Anthony Kennedy. Id. at 315–16.
Conservatives within and outside of the Reagan administration thought Ginsburg was more
conservative than Kennedy. Id. at 312–16.
82. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of Judicial Independence, 80
JUDICATURE 117, 119 (1996) (“[P]residents have so often been disappointed in their predictions
. . . [that] many take [this] as an important exhibit in the showcase of judicial independence.”);
Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts
of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1994) (noting that the efforts of
Presidents Reagan and Bush to “pack” the Supreme Court with conservatives fell short of pol-
icy objectives); Linda Greenhouse, Candid Look at High Court Finds that Presidents Can’t Pack
Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1984, at 1 (quoting Justice William Rehnquist’s statement that, al-
though presidents have the full right to pack the Court, presidents are likely to be disappointed
by the votes and opinions of their nominees).
84. See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 471 (1998) (“The history of the United States ju-
diciary is replete with examples of judges appointed for life tenure whose decisions disappointed
their appointing President.”).
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myth of the Court as a principled institution, a myth that many be-
lieve is a critical reason that the Court’s decisions are respected.85
Life tenure does have a liberating effect on a Justice. But the fact
that a Justice will have independence need not render his or her judi-
cial philosophy completely inscrutable. Those who recommend judi-
cial candidates for nomination frequently have enough evidence of a
nominee’s views to make reasonable estimates of his or her positions
on key questions. They surely err from time to time, but a careful
screening process can often develop a reasonably accurate picture of
a person’s outlook on broad questions of constitutional interpreta-
tion. The Court’s results seldom prove entirely satisfying to purists
because Court results require five votes, no one can predict individual
voting patterns with complete accuracy, and no one can anticipate all
the important issues that will come before the Court. The inability to
achieve complete doctrinal satisfaction, however, is not a reason to
abandon the attempt to move the Court, to the greatest possible ex-
tent, by strategic appointments.86 On big issues, about which the
president and his appointments team care most deeply, the idea that
nominees are unpredictable is more myth than reality. “[I]t is un-
doubtedly true that the Supreme Court is susceptible to periodic po-
litical shifts due to its obvious connection to changes in political
power . . . .”87
The connection between strategic appointments and the direc-
tion of the Court partly explains the constitutional shifts now under
way.88 Yet stopping here would leave that explanation unsatisfactorily
85. Polling data suggest that, although the public thinks Supreme Court decisions are po-
litical, the public nonetheless has more respect for this branch of government than for the other
two. See, e.g., Roger Handberg & William S. Maddox, Public Support for the Supreme Court in
the 1970s, 10 AM. POL. Q. 333, 337 (1982) (analyzing some explanations of public support for
the Court based on national surveys conducted in 1972, 1974, and 1976 by the Center for Politi-
cal Studies); Richard Lehne & John Reynolds, The Impact of Judicial Activism on Public Opin-
ion, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 896, 897 (1978) (using the Dolbeare-Hammond study on public support
for the Court).
86. Judicial selection is influenced by other considerations in addition to ideology. This is
an additional reason why a selection strategy will fall short of complete success. For example,
diversifying the Court by adding individuals from racial or ethnic groups heretofore absent from
the Court is an important consideration among Democrats and, to a degree, among Republi-
cans. Friendships also weigh in the balance, although in recent years no president has appointed
a confidant or friend.
87. Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 34 (1993).
88. See, e.g., Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–83 (2001) (providing an extensive description of how a strategic ap-
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disconnected from the political and social changes outside the Court
that in many respects parallel the doctrinal shifts on the inside. De-
spite the fact that the numbers of people identifying with liberal or
conservative ideologies have not changed much,89 no one evaluating
the energy and vitality of political ideologies in the United States to-
day could miss the fact that in recent years conservative positions
have had momentum and liberal positions have been on the defen-
sive.90 Even the “L-word” itself has been thrown into disrepute.91 In
many areas of public policy, conservative issues set the national
agenda. From the issues of vouchers and choice in education, to the
structure of the welfare state, to the need for a strong military despite
the demise of the Soviet Union, to the concern over declining moral
values, to the concern over the victims of reverse discrimination, con-
servatives have mounted substantial offensives. Liberals, on the other
hand, cannot decide whether to persist in defending positions that
seem more and more shopworn or to jump onto the still ill-defined
“third way” bandwagon of the New Democrats.92
Nowhere is the parallel between legal doctrine and political pro-
gram more apparent than in the context of the federalism decisions
and the devolution movement. Throughout the 1990s, the call for de-
volving more authority from the federal government to the states had
enormous political appeal. The Unfunded Mandates Act,93 waivers of
federal standards for state-initiated experiments in welfare program-
ming,94 welfare reform that vests increased programmatic authority in
pointment strategy can result in “partisan entrenchment” if one party is able to make enough
appointments to change the direction of the Court).
89. The National Election Studies measure of conservatism in the United States has stayed
remarkably stable over the years, varying between fifty-one and fifty-four (on a scale of one
hundred) between 1964 and 1998. The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior:
Conservatism Index 1964–1998, National Election Studies, available at http://www.umich.edu/
~nes/nesguide/toptable/tab3_3.htm (Sept. 12, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
90. DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT 1-3 (1992).
91. Alan Ryan, Liberal Political Theory: Always Unpopular, IDEAS, No. 2, 2000, at 48.
92. For a discussion of the third way movement, see generally Christopher H. Schroeder,
Third Way Environmentalism, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 801 (2000).
93. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. V 1999).
94. See Michelle L. VanWiggeren, Comment, Experimenting with Block Grants and Tem-
porary Assistance: The Attempt to Transform Welfare by Altering Federal-State Relations and
Recipients’ Due Process Rights, 46 EMORY L.J. 1327, 1333–36 (1997) (detailing the reemergence
in the 1980s and 1990s of state authority in carrying out federal welfare programs, and stating
that “as of 1996, forty-three states operated programs under at least one waiver”).
SCHROEDER.DOC 02/07/02 11:44 AM
326 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:307
the states,95 and the efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency
to build federal-state partnerships for program design and implemen-
tation96 all respond to the demand for devolution. In almost all policy
areas, states are portrayed as the venues for creative and innovative
solutions, and the federal government is the home of “one-size-fits-
all” solutions that are inflexible and inappropriate by comparison.97
The Court’s doctrinal shifts shaving back federal authority and
affording more autonomy to state governments are judicial analogues
to these administrative and legislative devolution initiatives.98 Any
understanding of the Court as an institution embedded in society will
require a deeper understanding of the connections between these
parallel activities.
Externalists cast the connection in a direct and straightforward
way.99 Externalism is the explanation for judicial decisionmaking that
has dominated political science for the last forty years. It models judi-
cial decisionmaking by assuming that Justices decide cases according
to their personal preferences for outcomes. “[T]he Supreme Court
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideologi-
cal attitudes and values of the justices,”100 and Justices regularly exer-
cise their freedom “to base their decisions solely upon personal policy
preferences.”101 From an externalist viewpoint, presidents who favor
devolution as a political preference appoint Justices who share that
preference. Once confirmed, the Justices give life to those policies in
their decisions.
Externalists can point to the “switch in time” as a particularly
stark example of their model at work (although the switch itself was
95. Id. at 1335–51 (explaining the operation of the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, and arguing that much of the shift of decisionmaking
authority from federal to state governments already had occurred prior to its enactment).
96. See NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: AN AGENDA FOR CONGRESS, EPA, & THE STATES 46–52, 197–200 (1997) (sum-
marizing the National Environmental Performance Partnership System, which was developed
by the Environmental Protection Agency to share authority with the states).
97. Environmental regulation has been one policy area in which these characterizations are
increasingly common. Id.
98. See infra notes 170–76 and accompanying text.
99. See Laura Kalman, Law, Politics and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE. L.J. 2165, 2168–78
(1999) (using the terms “externalist” and “internalist”).
100. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993).
101. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 72
(1976).
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made by a sitting Justice).102 Faced with an assault on the institution of
the Court itself—President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Court-packing
plan and proposed constitutional amendments that would permit su-
permajorities of the House and Senate to overrule any Supreme
Court decision—Justices Roberts and Hughes became more amena-
ble to New Deal legislation.103 According to the externalist account,
Justices Roberts and Hughes bowed to the political pressure made
apparent by Roosevelt’s reelection in 1936,104 pressure that was
brought to bear on the Justices by the then-circulating proposals to
pack the Court or to amend the Constitution to weaken the Court’s
power of judicial review.105 President Roosevelt’s strategic appoint-
ment of like-minded persons then reinforced the Court’s newly found
sympathy for New Deal programs. Nothing internal to the legal proc-
ess prompted these changes; they can be explained only by invoking
causal forces external to that process.
Externalist theories explain more recent doctrinal changes in a
similar fashion. The shifting fortunes of the major political parties
have been translated into the appointment of enough conservative
Justices to change outcomes on the Court. To answer the question of
102. Owen Roberts was the Justice whose “switch in time” reversed the Court’s approach to
New Deal legislation, but the ascendancy of post-Lochner jurisprudence was secured only when
President Roosevelt appointed Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O.
Douglas, Frank Murphy, James F. Byrnes, Harlan F. Stone, Robert H. Jackson, and Wiley B.
Rutledge to the Court. President Roosevelt’s paramount criterion for selecting these Justices
was fidelity to the tenets of what we now call post-Lochner jurisprudence. HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME
COURT 209–10 (2d ed. 1985).
103. Justice Roberts’s “conversion” first manifested itself when he joined a five-Justice ma-
jority in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage
law). Roberts subsequently joined identical five-Justice majorities in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the Wagner Act), Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s “Federal Old-Age Benefits” provision), and Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s tax on employ-
ers).
104. See, e.g., Kalman, supra note 99, at 2169 (“Roberts and Hughes changed course
abruptly in 1937. . . . because of the threat posed by FDR’s Court-packing plan.”); William
Lasser, The Supreme Court in Periods of Critical Realignment, 47 J. POL. 1174, 1182 (1985)
(stating that after the 1936 election, “the Court succumbed to the verdict of the people”).
105. Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 631
(1994) (“[F]or more than a decade and a half, most studies of the constitutional crisis of 1937
concluded that politics, in the form of FDR’s reelection and his Court reorganization plan,
caused the Court to alter its voting pattern.”).
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why those fortunes have shifted, one must look to theories of political
change, such as critical election or punctuated equilibria theory.106
The legal profession is more familiar with internalist explana-
tions of judicial decisionmaking than with externalist explanations. In
contrast to the externalist approach, the internalist approach posits
that Justices decide cases based on their good faith efforts to apply le-
gal reasoning to the existing body of authoritative materials.107 Ad-
herents of internalism challenge externalism by engaging in close
analysis of cases to see whether they are consistent with precedent
and sound legal reasoning108 or by touting examples of cases decided
against the presumed preferences of the judges.109 Some internalists
do not even concede the “switch in time” to the externalists. Scholars
such as Barry Cushman and Richard Friedman,110 for example, “em-
phasize the plausible internal and intellectual reasons for the Court’s
journey” in the 1930s, by “point[ing] to doctrinal changes that began
before 1937 and continued thereafter.”111 In explaining the recent
shifts in Supreme Court doctrine, internalism would strive to demon-
106. On critical elections, see THE END OF REALIGNMENT? INTERPRETING AMERICAN
ELECTORAL ERAS (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991) (containing essays describing and debating criti-
cal election theory). On punctuated equilibria, see FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D.
JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3–24 (1993) (describing punctu-
ated equilibria in American policy and politics), and Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional
Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman’s We the
People, 108 YALE L.J. 2237, 2249–61 (1999) (applying the theory of punctuated equilibria to
constitutional change). See also Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining
the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 477, 480–86 (2001) (describing different
theories of political change).
107. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Un-
fortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (1997) (“The classic legal
model [internalism] suggests that the path of the law can be identified through reasoned analysis
of factors internal to the law.”). Cross’s article is an excellent review and analysis of existing re-
search on the externalist model, as well as the tensions between internalism and externalism.
Internalists concede that judges can on occasion give expression to their own policy preferences,
but they insist that decisions based on reasoned analysis of factors internal to the law are possi-
ble and that they predominate in judicial decisionmaking.
108. See, e.g., Kalman, supra note 99, at 2174–78 (summarizing how internalists attempt to
link pre-1937 and post-1937 cases through normal techniques of judicial reasoning); Pepper, su-
pra note 56, at 70–81 (same).
109. See infra note 112.
110. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
111. Kalman, supra note 99, at 2169. Internalist interpretations of the events of 1937 are not
new. Such interpretations had advocates in the immediate aftermath. See Ariens, supra note
105, at 630 (pointing to MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS (1937), as an early ex-
ample).
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strate that recent decisions can be justified by applying standard pre-
cepts of legal reasoning to existing legal materials.
Both internalism and externalism have characteristic strengths
and weaknesses in explaining legal change. By invoking facts external
to the process of legal reasoning, externalists treat new appointments
to the Court as a shock to the judicial system that upsets the prior dis-
tribution of votes on the Court, causing a new configuration of policy
preferences to comprise the majority. By stressing outside factors, ex-
ternalism takes advantage of the obvious. Externalism’s weakness is
that it does a disservice to the phenomenology of judging. Judges
regularly report that they experience law as constraining.112 People
typically describe themselves as pursuing their preferences willingly,
not as doing so reluctantly or under duress. To cope with the appar-
ent fact that law is experienced as constraining, the externalist posi-
tion must assert either that (a) judges are deluding themselves about
what they are doing; or (b) judges are dissembling when they explain
what they are doing.113 Both positions lie beyond the ability of exter-
nalists to verify, and both prove unsatisfying, even to those judicial
observers prepared to concede that judges on occasion reach deci-
sions based on policy preferences.
Internalism respects the feelings of judges and lawyers who re-
port that they feel constrained by the law. Its greatest difficulty lies in
developing a coherent explanation for the kind of legal change repre-
sented by the recent federalism decisions—changes that, whether
revolutionary or not, depart significantly from the cases that preceded
them. By emphasizing that law develops incrementally through appli-
cation of legal reasoning to existing legal materials, internalism sug-
gests that new decisions necessarily will be continuous with the old.
So how does sharp change occur? Two explanations are possible. On
the one hand, the new direction can be interpreted as a correction of
112. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 55, at 41 (insisting that law is largely autonomous from
politics and that it cannot be reduced “to the status of dependent variable . . . [because doing so
would] deny that judges deciding cases experience legal ideas as constraints on their own politi-
cal preferences”); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge’s Response to the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 307–08 (1987) (claiming based on his experience as
a judge that “legal doctrine is a real force, judges follow it, and they decide all but a small frac-
tion of the cases that come before them in accordance with what they perceive to be the con-
trolling legal rules”).
113. See Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeterminacy with One
Bold Thought, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 113, 118 (1990) (noting that externalists think that “justifica-
tory legal language . . . . is a mode of couching the personal legislative preferences of unelected
judges in the publicly venerated language of a judicial decree”).
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error. For example, an internalist may argue that constitutional
change occurs when the Court abandons erroneous recent decisions
for earlier correct ones. A “restorationist” story of this kind is popu-
lar among lawyers who favor originalism.114 The second explanation
already has been suggested. Internalists may dispute the premise that
the Court has departed from precedent. By engaging in (what they
claim is) a more sophisticated analysis of the legal materials, inter-
nalists of this stripe attempt to show that what has been described as a
shift actually is continuous with prior interpretations.115
There are serious problems with either internalist explanation.
The restorationist approach can explain at best only constitutional
changes that move in the direction from error to reason. But for every
one of these enlightened moves there must have been a prior move
from reason to error. This approach lacks any theory to explain why
error was made in the first place. The revisionist approach, on the
other hand, fails to provide a convincing account of why, among the
possible routes legal development might have taken, a particular one
was chosen. When dealing with significant changes in doctrine, there
always will be a more straightforward course of doctrinal develop-
ment that could have been chosen—it is the deviation from that
course that prompts the need for a deeper revisionist explanation. For
example, even after the erudite and close revisionist analyses of
Cushman, Friedman, and others, the most that has been shown is that
the post-1937 decisions are more consistent with prior decisions than
was commonly supposed. These analyses cannot demonstrate that the
post-1937 decisions were compelled by prior decisions according to
the normal methods of judicial reasoning.116 Whenever more than one
outcome is consistent with prior decisions, revisionism cannot explain
why the Court chose one path rather than another.
114. See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2117
(1999) (describing “the best known, most widely accepted, and most implausible account of con-
stitutional change during the New Deal—that it involved no real change as such, but was simply
a restoration of the previous wisdom of the Marshall Court”). Bruce Ackerman refers to this
approach as “the myth of rediscovery.” 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 43.
115. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
116. Revisionists rely upon a handful of pre-1937 decisions as laying the jurisprudential
groundwork for 1937 cases such as West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin. The best evidence
that the earlier decisions did not compel those 1937 results comes from lower court decisions
from the 1930s. Lower courts did not read the pre-1937 cases as compelling the results of 1937.
Pepper, supra note 56, at 100–03, 112–14. The scholarly community at the time also did not find
that the pre-1937 cases logically compelled the 1937 results. E.g., id. at 120 (“To most [liberal]
scholars . . . the promise of Nebbia was a distant memory [by 1936] . . . .”).
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The weaknesses of the internal and external approaches indicate
that neither model, standing alone, is sufficient to explain judicial de-
cisionmaking. This should compel observers to look beyond these two
traditional approaches for an adequate explanation of doctrinal
change. Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments is one alterna-
tive to purely internalist or externalist explanations. It identifies the
four-step procedure characterized by institutional impasse and popu-
lar mobilization—instead of the enshrinement of an individual judge’s
policy preferences or the conscientious application of legal reasoning
to existing legal authorities—as codifying the successful revolutionary
impulse. Once codified, these new revolutionary values are incorpo-
rated into the body of texts available to judges as they approach sub-
sequent disputes. A judge’s subsequent elaboration of these constitu-
tional changes then can be explained through internal modeling.
Ackerman’s theory thus takes advantage of the externalist insight
that significant legal change usually results from shocks external to
the system as well as the internalist insight that judges approach their
job with a professional commitment to the relative autonomy of the
law. The bridge between these externalist and internalist insights—
the most controversial feature of the theory—is Ackerman’s constitu-
tional moment, in which those external shocks are translated into le-
gitimate legal texts to which the tools of legal reasoning can be ap-
plied.117
Yet Ackerman’s theory of how the gap between the external and
the internal is bridged does not explain the Court’s recent federalism
jurisprudence. Conspicuously absent are the laborious public and po-
litical processes that would explain the recent federalism changes as a
constitutional moment. Despite the inapplicability of Ackerman’s ap-
117. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 60–61. Ackerman emphasizes that judges can and do
actually decide cases according to law, while adding the important thought that the legal materi-
als judges use can be legitimately affected by events external to the Court’s jurisprudence.
Does it even make sense to think of “constitutional interpretation” as a disciplined
activity with its own criteria of good and bad arguments, its own claim to integrity?
Or is it just a mystifying shell game that conceals each participant’s ordinary politi-
cal commitments? These questions are absolutely critical to your assessment of
[my interpretive] enterprise . . . . Despite the difficulties, courts have in fact de-
vised a rough-and-ready way to sustain the values of constitutional politics against
erosion by normal politics. This conclusion will be of special importance to the
professionals charged with keeping the machine in good working order.
Id. In my view, Ackerman’s position is therefore not simply another externalist one, although
that is how he has sometimes been interpreted. See, e.g., Kalman, supra note 99, at 2170 (“I read
Ackerman to embrace the externalist position.”).
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proach, his underlying desire to combine what is sound in each of the
internalist and externalist models ought to inform any attempt to un-
derstand the Court’s recent federalism decisions.
The remainder of this Essay advances a thesis about judicial
change that bridges the gap between externalism and internalism in a
way that overcomes the weaknesses of each. The account is external-
ist in arguing that the dynamics of constitutional change can be un-
derstood only by recognizing that the Supreme Court is embedded in
society, and that the events and social forces that affect public opin-
ion, intellectuals, and others also influence the judiciary. It is inter-
nalist as well, for it endorses a version of the view that judges take
doctrine and techniques of legal reasoning seriously. It explains that
judges’ responses to social forces are shaped by the doctrinal lens
through which they must be filtered. The social, intellectual, and eco-
nomic movements that lie behind conservative political successes also
condition judges’ thought processes with respect to the kinds of ar-
guments they find persuasive.118
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS THE ALLOCATION OF
DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY
An account of the ways in which social, political, and cultural in-
fluences affect constitutional decisions must begin with an explana-
tion of the basic function constitutional decisions perform. When the
Court renders a constitutional decision, it is deciding the proper allo-
cation of decisionmaking power. Even decisions protecting individual
rights almost always protect rights to make decisions.119 Many of the
rights the Bill of Rights protects—the right to free speech,120 to prac-
tice religion,121 to bear arms,122 to a jury trial in criminal prosecu-
118. This argument does not claim to constitute a general theory of the interaction between
social, economic, and intellectual contexts on the one hand and judicial doctrine on the other,
although the approach it develops may apply in other doctrinal areas.
119. The exceptions are rights protected by an inalienability rule, such as the Thirteenth
Amendment right not to be enslaved. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092–93 (1972) (describing rights protected by liability rules, property rules, and inalienability
rules); see also Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 824–
25 (1993) (summarizing Calabresi and Melamed’s different forms of entitlement).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
121. Id.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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tions,123 and so on—are grants of decisionmaking power to the indi-
vidual as opposed to the government. Because an individual can de-
cline to exercise any of these rights, or can waive them, a constitu-
tional decision in her favor empowers her to make the decision
whether to bear arms, practice religion, speak freely, be tried by a
jury, and so on.
Federalism doctrines allocate decisionmaking authority even
more obviously. These doctrines often are referred to as the struc-
tural part of the Constitution because they allocate authority among
branches of government. When a federalism doctrine prevents Con-
gress from compelling state performance (to implement a prepur-
chase background check for handguns, to submit to jurisdiction in
federal or state court, or to carve religious exceptions out of laws of
general application, for example), the federalism barrier vests the
state with the autonomous power to decide whether to cooperate with
the federal plan. Either the federal government or the state govern-
ment is allocated the power to make this choice. The constitutional
decision determines the allocation.124
Internalists posit that constitutional text, history, purpose, and
legal reasoning provide answers to the question of how power ought
to be allocated. Externalists posit that judges, like the rest of us, have
preferences with respect to who holds power—a claim that internal-
ists do not deny (although they deny that those preferences are con-
trolling)—and that these preferences control legal decisions.
In claiming a quasi-independent status for legal reasoning, inter-
nalists must confront the fact that there is a good deal of empirical
support for the theory propounded by the externalists. Study after
study has shown a significant correlation between various measures of
Justices’ policy preferences and their votes.125 Is there an account of
legal reasoning that maintains the quasi-independent character of le-
gal reasoning while also explaining why judicial decisions frequently
follow judicial preferences?
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
124. Before the Court decides a constitutional claim that allocates decisionmaking authority,
it inevitably faces a threshold power allocation question. The Court must consider several justi-
ciability and jurisdictional doctrines—such as subject matter jurisdiction, in personam jurisdic-
tion, standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine—to determine whether the Court
will make the underlying power-allocating decision or whether the Court will accede to the de-
termination of other branches of government.
125. See Cross, supra note 107, at 277–78 (discussing several studies by political scientists
that show ideological decisionmaking by judges).
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The following Part develops a theory of how people acquire
preferences about the allocation of government decisionmaking
authority. It argues that a crucial issue in acquiring these preferences
is trust, an attitude dependent upon three key criteria that are histori-
cally and socially contingent. Within the last thirty years, trust in fed-
eral institutions has declined, and historical and social conditions go a
long way toward explaining why federal solutions to policy problems
are less attractive today compared to state, local, or individual solu-
tions.126 Part V then describes research in the cognitive sciences sug-
gesting that attitudes about the trustworthiness of the federal gov-
ernment might have an internal effect on the persuasiveness of
certain arguments related to the allocation of decisionmaking author-
ity.
IV.  TRUST IN GOVERNMENT
Trust is a more complicated concept than many people assume.
Trust can be specific (e.g., I trust my garage mechanic to fix my car),
or trust can be general (e.g., I trust my sister to raise her children
well).127 The decision to trust another person turns on three considera-
tions. First, my decision to trust someone depends on whether I be-
lieve that in executing whatever responsibilities I give her, the other
will act to further my desires or interests. This belief could arise be-
cause of incentives created by the relationship, such as my agreeing to
pay a mechanic only for a successful repair job. Incentives also could
be created because of the anticipation of future interactions. Even if I
am unable to judge the quality of a repair job when I pick up my car, I
have a choice whether to return to that mechanic. If my experience
driving the car later reveals a shoddy repair, I may not return, and I
also may advise others to go elsewhere for their repairs.
126. This Essay was written before terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York
and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. There are early indications that in the aftermath of
these events, confidence in the federal government has become stronger than at any time in the
past thirty years. See infra note 191. This revival of trust in the federal government, even if it
proves to be of more than transitory duration, would not detract from this Essay’s main point
that the level of trust in a government body affects the amount of decisionmaking power it is
allocated. Consistent with this Essay’s analysis, the revival of trust caused by the terrorist at-
tacks could affect the future direction of federalism decisions. For further discussion of the af-
termath of the events of September 11, 2001, on the course of federalism doctrine, see infra
notes 191, 202, and 232.
127. Russell Hardin, Trust in Government, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 9, 12 (Valerie
Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).
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Russell Hardin has called this aspect of trust “encapsulated in-
terest.”128 He writes that
I can . . . say I trust you with respect to some action if your reason
for doing it is to take me into account in some relevant way. Typi-
cally your reason will be that it is in your interest to maintain our
relationship. Hence, my trust in you is typically encapsulated in your
interest in fulfilling my trust.129
Besides being maintained by the incentives that are part of a relation-
ship, trust also could be maintained by the belief that the other per-
son shares my beliefs and preferences. If that is so, my interests will
be taken into account simply by virtue of the other person acting ac-
cording to her interests. Because the Antifederalists thought such
shared interest was essential to the representational process in gov-
ernment, they insisted that any legislative body be a “miniature” or
“exact portrait” of the people as a whole.130 More recently, William
Bianco has argued that the belief that an elected representative
shares “common interests” with voters is an important factor in vot-
ers’ decisions to trust those representatives.131
A second consideration affecting trust is competence. I will be
more prepared to trust the garage mechanic to fix my car properly if I
believe he has the skills to do so. Competence includes elements of
knowledge, training, and intellect. Interest groups and elites play an
indispensable societal role by providing signals and cues to usually
less well-informed citizens regarding the merits of government poli-
cies. They could not do so if citizens did not believe they were capable
of evaluating policy consequences correctly.132
Finally, the decision to trust depends upon the costs of declining
to do so. The greater the disparity between the consequences of
trusting or not, the more likely a person is to invest trust. I may doubt
the competence of a mechanic, but if the consequence of not having
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id.
130. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION, 203, 234–43 (1996) (summarizing Antifederalist complaints that the
Constitution made Congress too small to provide an exact portrait of the American people).
131. WILLIAM BIANCO, TRUST 45 (1994).
132. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 61
(1998) (“[A] speaker’s statements can persuade an observer when the observer believes the
speaker to be knowledgeable and truthful in what he says . . . .”).
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him repair my car is that I will be late for a job interview in the next
town, I likely will take the chance.133
The nation’s declining willingness to give decisionmaking
authority to the federal government134 is attributable to the federal
government’s poor performance during the last thirty-five years with
respect to all three of these components of trust.135
A. Encapsulated Interest
Americans increasingly believe that national representatives do
not have their interests in mind when making decisions in Washing-
ton. Citizens believe that the self-interest of politicians is aligned with
concentrated interest groups and moneyed interests that provide
benefits to politicians both during office and after.
By a 74% to 17% margin, Americans think members of Congress
work on making themselves look better rather than on making the
country better.136 By a 61% to 32% margin, people think it is impossi-
ble for members of Congress to avoid being influenced in their poli-
cymaking decisions by the financial contributions that they receive.137
Accordingly, people believe that congressional decisionmaking is
dominated by special interests that can contribute to campaigns in
amounts that individuals cannot match. When asked about the power
of different groups over national policymaking, 79% to 88% of peo-
ple responded that “big companies,” “political parties,” the “news
media,” and “political lobbyists” all exert too much influence.138 Top-
133. Perhaps the decision to hire the mechanic does not result from trust, but instead results
from a reluctant acceptance of the necessity of giving him the job. The three factors of encap-
sulated interest, competence, and costs are all germane to the power allocation decisions central
to this Essay, regardless of whether the dependent variable they affect is labeled a decision to
trust or a decision to invest responsibility.
134. For evidence of this decline, see infra notes 144–55 and accompanying text.
135. These three variables may not be completely independent. For instance, Tom Tyler’s
research suggests that the “benevolence of the motives of the authority”—a characteristic simi-
lar to encapsulated interest—affects one’s judgment that the authority is competent and honest.
Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Democratic Governance, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE, supra note
127, at 269–70, 273. The extent of their interdependence does not affect the present analysis.
136. Capitol Hill Watch: Congressional Facts and Figures, 29 NAT’L J. 524, 524 (1997) (citing
a poll by Opinion Dynamics for Fox News, conducted on February 19–20, 1997).
137. Id.
138. Louis Harris and Associates Poll of Nov. 8, 1994, Roper Center for Public Opinion Re-
search, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession number
0224610) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (observing that 86% of those surveyed believed
that big companies have too much influence in Washington); Louis Harris and Associates Poll
of Nov. 8, 1994, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/
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ping the list of groups with too much influence are “PACS who give
money to political candidates”—88% thought they exert too much in-
fluence.139 What is more, Americans differentiate sharply between
special interests and the interests of ordinary Americans such as
themselves. Eighty-two percent polled in 1992 felt that “those we
elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty
quickly.”140 Only 16% disagreed.141 The conviction that members of
Congress look out for themselves and for the special interests, but not
for the average citizen, produces very low confidence in the institu-
tion. Overall, only 11% of those responding in 1997 expressed “a
great deal of confidence” in Congress.142
A remark made by a citizen to the Washington Post summarizes
the public’s overall disposition toward Congress: “‘Unfortunately I
think that . . . there are so many special-interest groups that have
bucks, and [members of Congress] are going to work on taking care
of them. The people that make the most noise get the most attention,
universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession number 0224611) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (observing that 80% of those surveyed believed that political parties have too much
influence in Washington); Louis Harris and Associates Poll of Nov. 8, 1994, Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (ac-
cession number 0224612) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (observing that 79% of those sur-
veyed believed that the news media have too much influence in Washington); Louis Harris and
Associates Poll of Nov. 8, 1994, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession number 0224613) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (observing that 79% of those surveyed believed that political lobbyists have too
much influence in Washington).
139. Louis Harris and Associates Poll of Nov. 8, 1994, Roper Center for Public Opinion Re-
search, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession number
0224609) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
140. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC OPINION OF CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 13, tbl.5
(1993) (citing an ABC News Poll of Apr. 8–9, 1992). John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
report the same general findings—that 86% of respondents stated that special interest groups
exert too much influence—and the same disjunction between “special interests” and the general
population:
Whereas close observers of politics are likely to see interest groups as vital links be-
tween the public and the government, helping to capture and to express the diversity
of the public’s views, the people themselves see the situation quite differently. Inter-
est groups, they contend, are definitely not connected with ordinary people, even re-
motely. Instead, the popular notion is that these special interests are completely di-
vorced from the public interest.
JOHN HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS THE PUBLIC ENEMY 63–64
(1995).
141. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 140, at 13, tbl.5 (1993) (citing an ABC News Poll
of April 8–9, 1992).
142. Louis Harris & Associates Poll, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at A5.
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and those people have the money and the numbers to get it.’”143 The
sentiment this remark encapsulates is the opposite of trust.
B. Competence
People learn about the government’s competence from experi-
ence with prior government efforts to undertake significant tasks. In
the past thirty years, such undertakings have been studded with fail-
ures. We might mark the onset of the Cynical Era with President
Lyndon B. Johnson’s campaign pledge that “no American boy will
fight a foreign war on a foreign soil if I’m elected president.”144 Within
a year of that remark, President Johnson dramatically increased draft
calls and began a massive buildup of American soldiers in Vietnam.145
For some, the Vietnam War was one of the federal government’s
most notable failures because the government refused to prosecute
the war to a successful conclusion; for others, it was a failure because
of the government’s decision to enter the war in the first place. The
Vietnam War shook citizens’ confidence in the competence of the
federal government.146
Around the time of President Johnson’s reversal, polls measuring
trust or confidence in government showed a steep decline, a decline
from which confidence levels have not recovered.147 Subsequent
events did not bring about a recovery of confidence: Watergate came
on the heels of the Vietnam War, and both President Nixon’s duplic-
ity and President Ford’s subsequent unpopular pardon of Nixon ce-
mented the public’s distrust of Washington.
The 1970s also brought the energy crisis, as well as severe infla-
tion and high interest rates, undermining confidence in the federal
government’s ability to control critical elements of the nation’s eco-
nomic life—elements that Keynesians and others had assured the
public could be managed. Toward the end of the decade, President
Carter became ensnared by the Iranian hostage crisis, which many
143. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 140, at 65.
144. JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 194 (1995).
145. See generally CIA Warned LBJ in ’65 that Vietnam War Would Fail, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Mar. 30, 1994, at A9 (discussing the Central Intelligence Agency’s warning to President Johnson
prior to the 1965 troop buildup that the Vietnam War could not be won).
146. President Johnson’s inconsistent words and actions also undermined the first dimension
of trust, encapsulated interest.
147. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 140, at 33.
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people thought he handled ineptly.148 Violent crime surged. Faith in
the national government was hammered by these events. “The energy
shortages . . . suggested that government could not protect America’s
reliance on cheap, plentiful energy. The Iran hostage standoff . . .
suggested the mighty American government could not protect its citi-
zens abroad. And the surge in violent crime . . . suggested government
could not even protect its citizens at home.”149 Consequently, when
President Reagan began the 1980s by announcing in his inaugural ad-
dress that “government is not the solution to our problem,” his words
ratified and legitimized an already widespread opinion.150
Then came years of mounting budget deficits.151 Although federal
officials equivocated early on,152 leaders of both parties eventually en-
dorsed the thesis that deficits were irresponsible public policy and
needed to be eliminated.153 Despite its plenary power of the purse,
148. See, e.g., STEPHEN CRAIG, THE MALEVOLENT LEADERS: POPULAR DISCONTENT IN
AMERICA 2–3 (1993) (attributing the “strained relationship between citizens and their leaders”
to the fact that “[g]overnment in general, and the national government in particular, simply has
not done a very good job of dealing with the country’s most important problems,” and then
enumerating a list of similar failures).
149. CNN Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 20, 2001) (transcript on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
150. Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1981, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN, 1981, at 1 (1982).
151. Except for the 1969 fiscal year, the federal budget was in deficit every year from 1961 to
1997, but in relatively modest amounts until 1983, when the combined effects of the 1981
Reagan tax cut and a recession put the deficit over $100 billion for the first time. It reached a
high of $290 billion in 1992, and remained constant around $100 billion for thirteen consecutive
years. Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2002, Historical Tables, United
States Office of Management and Budget, available at http://wais.access.gpo.gov (Aug. 11, 2001)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
152. See, e.g., A Month After the Tax Cut, a Tax Hike, 13 NAT’L J. 1714, 1715 (1981) (citing
Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Murray Weidenbaum’s statement that the Reagan
administration was unconcerned about revenue loss that resulted from major tax cuts the year
before).
153. In 1985, one of the first major legislative efforts to reduce the budget deficit was co-
sponsored by two Republicans and one Democrat. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717
(1986) (noting that the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901–22 (1994)), was also known as the “Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act,” named after Rep. Phil Gramm (R-TX), Senator Warren Rudman (R-
NH), and Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC)). In 1987, the Congress established a bipartisan Na-
tional Economic Commission, composed of six Republicans and six Democrats, to propose solu-
tions to the budget deficit. See, e.g., Bob Woodward, No-Tax Vow Scuttled Anti-Deficit Mission,
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1992, at A1 (asserting that the purpose of the NEC was to determine “a
way to eliminate the federal red ink that most economists believed was damaging the econ-
omy”). By 1990, Republican President George H.W. Bush had come to think the budget deficit
was such a significant domestic problem that he broke his “no new taxes” pledge to the Repub-
lican Convention in 1988 in order to support a bipartisan budget deficit plan that included tax
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Congress seemed incapable of balancing the budget, until it was res-
cued by a combination of devolutionary fiscal policy and a booming
economy.
The nearly two decades of budget deficits provide a stunning ex-
ample of a category of public problems in which Congress is unable to
satisfy the public’s expectations. This “bound-to-fail” category in-
cludes problems everyone agrees should be fixed, and that could be
fixed by any of several methods, none of which commands a political
consensus.154 Examples include maintaining a strong economy, re-
ducing violent crime, and eliminating the deficit. When Congress fails
to act, or is perceived as taking only weak or partial measures, people
increases. E.g., Susan Page, Read-His-Lips Reversal; Bush Concedes Tax Hikes are Needed to
Offset Deficit, NEWSDAY, June 27, 1990, at 3 (quoting President Bush):
It is clear to me that both the size of the deficit problem and the need for a package
that can be enacted require all of the following: Entitlement and mandatory program
reform; tax revenue increases; growth incentives; discretionary spending reductions;
orderly reductions in defense expenditures; and budget process reform. . . . The bipar-
tisan congressional leadership agree with me on these points.
Breaking that pledge may have cost President Bush his 1992 reelection. President Clinton later
claimed credit for reducing the budget deficit in his 1994 State of the Union Address. See Presi-
dent William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address delivered before the Joint Session
of Congress (Jan. 26, 1994) (“Last year, we began to put our house in order by tackling the
budget deficit that [is] driving us toward bankruptcy.”). The budget deficit had been a major
campaign issue in the 1992 race between Bush, Clinton and third-party candidate Ross Perot,
who insisted that the major parties were ducking the hard choices necessary to solve the prob-
lem. See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Politicians Wavering on Debt Crisis Issue; Candidates Fall Far
Short on Solutions, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1992, at A1 (describing Perot’s insistence that the
major parties were avoiding putting forth realistic plans to address the problem of the national
debt, which Perot described as “like a crazy aunt we keep down in the basement. All the neigh-
bors know she’s there, but nobody wants to talk about her.”). It was during that campaign cycle
that former Republican Senator Warren Rudman and former Democratic Senator (and former
candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1992) Paul Tsongas formed the Con-
cord Coalition, aimed at keeping both parties’ feet to the fire with regard to bringing down the
budget deficit. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Forcing the Candidates to Face Reality; Tsongas and
Rudman Hope to Extract More Honesty about the Deficit from Clinton and Bush, WASH. POST,
July 26, 1992, at C7 (describing the agenda of the Concord Coalition).
154. See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 140, at 53–56 (referring to the public’s reac-
tion in such situations as “valence dissatisfaction”); Lawrence C. Dodd, Congress and the Poli-
tics of Renewal: Redressing the Crisis of Legitimation, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 417, 418–
19 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993):
[T]o sustain the long-term support of the public, Congress and its members must
demonstrate a reasonable capacity to recognize the fundamental problems of a his-
torical era, deliberate over the proper solutions to these problems, and enact legisla-
tion that addresses them in a credible manner. The public does not expect miracles
from Congress . . . . But the public does look to Congress to grapple with the serious
issues of the day and to fashion reasonable strategies for addressing them.
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who disagree bitterly as to what Congress should do unite in their dis-
satisfaction with Congress having done nothing.155
Such inaction stems in large part from the system of checks and
balances built into the Constitution, but the public’s adverse reaction
to the resulting immobility redounds to the federal government’s det-
riment. Congress often is seen as the recalcitrant partner blocking
presidential initiatives.156 The president often is seen as the positive,
affirmative political actor, proposing programs, advancing an agenda,
and urging change. Congress has tremendous difficulty speaking af-
firmatively because it speaks with many voices, thus projecting a dif-
fuse image. The overall impression is that the institution has no co-
herent proposals for responding constructively to the country’s
pressing problems. Thus, when the political system stalls on issues for
which the public is convinced movement is essential, Congress is seen
as the negative, blocking institution, thwarting efforts to solve prob-
lems. Congress is not seen simply as failing to address public issues;
Congress is seen as obstructionist. The perception that Congress
dedicates inordinate attention to the self-interest of members
(meaning inordinate attention to special interests) reinforces the
public’s negative attitude toward Congress.157 Violating the maxim
155. See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 140, at 55:
The kind of policy dissatisfaction we picked up [and which we believe contributes to
dissatisfaction with the institution] seems to parallel the concept of valence issues
[those issues for which the desired ends are not in question, just the means]. Over-
whelming sentiment exists that the government should ‘do something’ about key
problems, but the public often demurs from engaging in the crucial debate about the
specific means by which something should be done.
156. See id. at 56 (“[C]ongressional power does not emanate from the setting of policy agen-
das, but from its ability to block what the president wants.”).
157. Not everyone lays the problem of Congress’s lack of performance at Congress’s door-
step. Jane Mansbridge argues that expectations of what Congress must do exceed its capabili-
ties, given the tools available to it. Jane Mansbridge, Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfac-
tion with U.S. Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT 133, 133–34 (Joseph
S. Nye, Jr. et al. eds., 1997):
Sociocultural changes have produced new problems, with consequent demands for
government solutions. Sociocultural changes have also independently produced rising
expectations for government action. Both these trends have generated governmental
“overload”—a situation in which citizens ask the government to solve problems it
cannot solve, ask the government to do more things (and more incompatible things)
than it can do, and ask the government to solve problems without being willing to sus-
tain taxation adequate to finance the efforts that would produce a solution. . . .
[T]hese greater demands on government operate within a system designed to go slow.
Whether the government is failing to accomplish achievable goals or failing because people de-
mand the impossible, the immediate impact is the same: people conclude that government lacks
the competence to address the problems the public thinks important.
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that one should either “lead, follow, or get out of the way,” Congress
too often strikes out, incapable of leading, and unwilling to follow.
C. Costs
During the past thirty years, the public perception of govern-
ment’s desirable attributes has changed, and the perceived cost of not
reposing trust in the federal government has been declining, making it
easier to allocate authority to state and local governments. These cur-
rent perceptions can be contrasted with the perceptions of an earlier
era that encouraged the federalization of much governmental respon-
sibility. Keith Whittington notes three features of the policymaking
environment that contributed to the push toward centralization in
earlier periods of the twentieth century.158 One is the administrative
ethic, in which expertise rather than local knowledge is thought to be
critical to good policy.159 Harkening back to the Progressive Era, the
administrative ethic posits that coherence and synopticism are attain-
able public policy goals, better implemented centrally than filtered
through fifty political processes. In contrast, recent years have seen
growing strength in the countervailing view that centralized deci-
sionmaking brings rigidity and one-size-fits-all dictates that ought to
be replaced by flexible responses to local situations, whether the con-
cern be welfare policy, education, or the environment. Modern un-
derstandings of bureaucracies—whether analyzed through the lens of
public choice on the right,160 through critical legal studies on the left,161
or through the cynical journalism of the mass media162—also have dis-
credited the Progressive ambition to establish a politics-free admini-
stration. Federal programs are as infused with politics as any other.
These shifting sensibilities have been accompanied by a growth in
state competence in the past thirty years,163 so that, to the extent that
expertise is still thought essential, the gap between the perceived
158. Keith Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Founda-
tions of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (1998).
159. Id. at 490–93.
160. See generally WILLIAM NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971).
161. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1276 (1984).
162. See generally Paul Starobin, A Generation of Vipers: Journalists and the New Cynicism,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.–Apr. 1995.
163. M. Kent Jennings, Political Trust and the Roots of Devolution, in TRUST AND
GOVERNANCE, supra note 127, at 218, 220–22.
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competence of state versus national government has narrowed con-
siderably.
The second feature Whittington identifies as contributing to cen-
tralization is the growth of the positive state, with its emphasis on the
regulatory and redistributive functions of government.164 The New
Dealers’ flirtations with government intervention prompted the con-
frontations with the Court in Schechter Poultry165 and Carter Coal.166
Ultimately, the confrontations were resolved by the Court’s retreat
from judicial superintendence of the reach of federal power. Even
though the New Deal never returned to such thoroughgoing interven-
tion in the market economy as the National Industrial Recovery
Act,167 the regulatory apparatus enabled by the Court’s withdrawal
was deployed in many different public programs, each with its con-
stituents favoring regulation of various dimensions of American in-
dustry and each favoring a centralized bureaucracy corresponding to
the national business structure being regulated.
Two of the great social movements of the last thirty years, the
civil rights movement and the environmental, health, and safety
movement, have been implemented through centralized, positive
state structures. In the case of civil rights, state governmental struc-
tures were the initial targets of federal policy, so federalization of the
issue was thought essential to respond to discrimination and its con-
tinuing effects. The environmental, health, and safety movement eas-
ily borrowed the rights rhetoric of the civil rights movement.168 If
every person in America had the right to breathe clean air, the instan-
tiation of that right as federal policy matched the sincerity of the
claim of right much more convincingly than leaving the development
of policy up to fifty different jurisdictions. Here, states were much
more sympathetic to nationalization than in the earlier civil rights
164. Whittington, supra note 158, at 494.
165. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) (invalidating
corporate codes of fair competition as unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority).
166. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288–317 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935); see ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM 38–47 (1995)
(summarizing the Roosevelt administration’s use of bills like the National Industrial Recovery
Act and the Bituminous Coal Act to create structures to govern business and labor to harmo-
nize the economy).
167. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933).
168. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Foreword: A Decade of Change in Regulating the
Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (Summer 1983) (“[E]arly legislation ex-
pressed coherent environmental values that could be translated into specific rights to environ-
mental quality shared by all citizens.”).
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struggles. States even advocated national action as a means of ensur-
ing that environmental, health, and safety rules would develop uni-
formly throughout the country, thereby minimizing competition be-
tween states.169
In contrast to the major social issues of thirty years ago, today’s
important issues do not so obviously demand a federal solution.170
Earlier federal efforts have accomplished a fair amount of what can
be accomplished centrally. The residual question is whether a cen-
tralized approach is still preferable to a decentralized approach.171
Underaddressed environmental problems, for example, include the
control of “non-point” sources of water pollution,172 “hot spots” of
toxic pollutants,173 and urban sprawl.174 Each of these problems re-
quires intense local involvement. Management of these problems
from Washington often is viewed more as a hindrance than as a bene-
fit.175 Even national environmental organizations, which rose to
prominence because Washington was the lead actor on environmental
issues, have begun to stress local strategies for the next generation of
environmental problems.176
169. See, e.g., Air Pollution—1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollu-
tion of the S. Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong. 1186 (1970) (statement of Douglas M. Head,
Attorney General, State of Minnesota and President, National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral) (“I would strongly support at least a very careful national review of the [air quality] stan-
dards making sure that they comply with a certain national minimum.”).
170. The threat of terrorism certainly demands strong federal action. In the wake of the
events of September 11, 2001, the renewed emphasis on federal competence to address this
threat may have a continuing positive effect on levels of trust. See infra notes 191, 202, 232.
171. Whittington, supra note 158, at 522.
172. Debra Knopman, Civic Environmentalism: Tackling Tough Land-Use Problems with
Innovative Governance, ENV’T, Dec. 1999, at 26.
173. Sheila Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in Envi-
ronmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,992, 10,992 (2000).
174. Rose A. Kob, Riding the Momentum of Smart Growth: The Promise of Eco-
Development and Environmental Democracy, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 153–57 (2000).
175. One reason the federalism decisions are criticized is because the notion that decentral-
ized solutions are more appropriate for modern social problems is only partially accurate. While
some problems seem to call for decentralization, others call for continued national and even in-
ternational attention. For example, many behaviors of international corporations cannot be
regulated effectively by states. Nor can global warming or the conservation of fisheries.
176. This shift draws on a tradition within American environmentalism that has dissented
from centralized approaches to environmental problem solving. EDWARD ABBEY, THE
MONKEYWRENCH GANG (1975), AMORY LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A
DURABLE PEACE (1977), and E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL (1973), are classic ex-
positions of aspects of this branch of environmental thought. See generally Christopher H.
Schroeder, The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Toxic Substances, in GOVERNMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 263 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1989) (demonstrating that existing ad-
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The third feature Whittington identifies as contributing to cen-
tralization is the change in public morality that occurred in the early
twentieth century. The emerging sense that government should inter-
vene more actively in social and economic activity produced a wave
of muckraking journalism exposing the deficiencies of government.177
At the time, though, the dominant faces of government in the country
were state and local, so these received the brunt of the criticism.178
Calls for reforming these levels of government were accompanied by
invocations of federal authority as a means to correct or compensate
for state and local deficiencies.179 In contrast, the repeated and wide-
spread criticisms of government and government programs in recent
years have concentrated on the federal government, the new domi-
nant face of government. The federal government receives the lion’s
share of media attention, so the media’s penchant for covering scan-
dal and conflict overwhelmingly highlights federal scandal and cor-
ruption, instead of state and local versions of the same thing.180 For is-
sues for which public morality insists that the government assume
responsibility, state and local governments appear more attractive
simply because they have been relatively free of negative media cov-
erage.
Earlier in the century, the public morality associated with federal
domestic policy was intended to strengthen the idea of American citi-
zenship and the rights associated with that citizenship. In contrast, the
most vocal moral demands of our time are demands for the recogni-
tion of diversity.181 Diversity finds expression in efforts to expand fed-
eral antidiscrimination legislation beyond race, gender, and religion.
Other diversity demands cannot be vindicated at the federal level,
ministrative procedures cannot adequately address the problems posed by the numerous chemi-
cals that may be toxic). In parallel fashion, the Court’s increased protection of state autonomy
draws on a tradition within American constitutional thought that has long dissented from cen-
tralization. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 130, at 131–60 (1996) (describing the debate between
Antifederalists and Federalists).
177. Whittington, supra note 158, at 500 n.75.
178. Id. at 500.
179. Id. at 500–01.
180. For discussions of the media’s concentration on the coverage of scandal, corruption,
and the campaign “horse race,” see generally JOSEPH A. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL
JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF CYNICISM: THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (1997); KATHLEEN
HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS (1992); THOMAS E. PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER (1994).
181. Whittington, supra note 158, at 516–20. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived
Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1958–60 (2001) (exploring
Americans’ attitudes toward diversity).
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though, and proponents of this kind of diversity support the alloca-
tion of decisionmaking authority to the lower levels of government.
Although there are countervailing forces that continue to make
federalization attractive, perspectives on the administrative ethic, the
positive state, and public morality indicate that state and local ap-
proaches to many social and economic policies have become more
appealing. Whether federal governance is superior to state govern-
ance is a much closer question than it was earlier in the century, so
people perceive the selection of state over federal power as less
costly.
Shifts in public perception of the extent to which federal officials
encapsulate our interests, of the federal government’s capacity to act
competently, and of the costs of removing power from the federal
government all contribute to the well-documented, widespread and
severe decline in overall trust in the federal government and the re-
ciprocal climb in measures of distrust and cynicism over the past
thirty-five years.182 The American National Election Study (NES) asks
four questions designed to probe the public’s trust in government; the
answers constitute the data for the NES Trust in Government In-
dex.183 The Index provides a useful overall gauge of the public’s will-
ingness to repose authority in the federal government.184
182. Widespread awareness of the phenomenon probably can be traced to Seymour Lipset
and William Schneider’s book-length treatment of the decline in trust in all major American
institutions that began around 1965. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE
CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND (1983). See
generally WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT, supra note 157 (discussing the wide-
spread loss of confidence in, and dissatisfaction with, the government).
183. The Trust in Government Index is constructed from the following items:
How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government to do what
is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?
Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out
for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all?
Do you think that people in government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste
some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?
Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not
very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?
The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, National Election Studies, available
at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_5.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
184. The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, National Election Studies,
available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/graphs/g5a_5_1.htm (last visited Aug. 19,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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Since 1964, NES has asked people, “How much of the time do you
think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is
right?”185 In 1964, the percentage of people responding either “just
about always” or “most of the time” was 76%.186 Over the next two
years, that percentage began to decline.187 In a 1995 Gallup poll, the
percentage responding “just about always” or “most of the time”
stood at 23%;188 in a 1999 Gallup poll, it was 34%;189 in a 2001 CBS
News poll, 27%.190 Not even terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, which has caused
many Americans to look to the federal government for a response,
raised the percentage to earlier levels. After the attacks, the figure
remained more than ten percentage points lower than the 1964 fig-
ure.191
This distrust of Washington has concrete political consequences.
The 1994 elections saw the Republicans benefit from this distrust,
gaining control of both houses of Congress for the first time in forty
years. Immediately prior to that election, attitudes toward Congress
equaled or exceeded all-time lows.192 There seems little question that
185. The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, National Election Studies,
available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/toptable/table5a_1. htm (last visited Aug. 22,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Gallup Poll of August 11, 1995, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at http://
web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession number 0249330) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
189. Gallup Poll of February 7, 1999, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at http://
web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession number 0325385) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
190. CBS News Poll of January 15, 2001, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession number 0377226) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
191. A Washington Post–ABC News poll after the terrorist attacks showed that this measure
of trust in the federal government had climbed to 64 percent. Richard Morin & Claudia Deane,
Poll: Americans’ Trust in Government Grows, WASH. POST ONLINE, Sept. 28, 2001, at http://
www.washingtonpost.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For further discussion of this
sharp change in trust in government and its implications for the direction of federalism doctrine,
see infra notes 202 and 232.
192. For instance, the percentage of people having a great deal of confidence in Congress
was down to 7% prior to the 1994 election. National Opinion Research Center General Social
Survey 1993, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe
(last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (accession number 0201974) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Perhaps the most telling indicator is the response when people were asked whether they ap-
proved of the job their own representative had been doing. In contemporary times, this figure
always has been much higher than the figure for the approval of Congress overall, due to the
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voters were fed up with so many years of Democratic control and
were hoping that new leadership would be superior to the old. None-
theless, the change in majority status in the 1994 elections had little
effect on the public’s overall opinion of Congress. Even during the
“honeymoon” period immediately following the 1994 election, 56%
of those polled felt that government programs and policies hindered
their family’s ability to achieve the American dream; only 31% felt
they helped.193
While willingness to give authority to the federal government has
been declining, willingness to give authority to state and local gov-
ernments has been rising. In the late 1960s, data based on a national
cross-sectional survey showed that people trusted the federal gov-
ernment more than either the state or local government.194 During the
1970s, however, “the relative standing of the national government
suffered an extraordinarily sharp decline,” a decline that was visible
“regardless of region, partisanship, urbanicity, or race.”195
Not only have relative measures of trust in federal, state, and lo-
cal governments changed dramatically, so have absolute levels. The
empirical data for evaluating absolute levels of confidence in state
and local levels of government are much thinner than the data about
trust in the federal government collected in the American National
Election Study. Still, the data that exist have been described as “star-
tling.”196
Whereas the national government suffered a loss of over 30 percent
in terms of trust and confidence, the state level dropped by half that
much and local government scarcely at all. Clearly, the tar brush did
ability of representatives to use their offices to cultivate positive approval ratings at home. Prior
to the 1994 election, this figure was below 50%, down from the 64% approval rating enjoyed as
recently as 1990. Compare ABC News–Washington Post Poll of October 20, 1994, Roper Center
for Public Opinion Research, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 15, 2001)
(accession number 0229428) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), with ABC News–Washington
Post Poll of October 10, 1990, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (accession number 0140434) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
193. Council for Excellence in Government Poll of March 16, 1995, Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (accession
number 0236535) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
194. Jennings, supra note 163, at 221 (providing the responses to the following question
posed by the 1968 National Election Studies: “In your case, do you have more faith and confi-
dence in the national government, in the government of this state, or in the local government
about here?”).
195. Id. at 225.
196. Id. at 229.
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not sweep with equal vigor across all levels. Disenchantment with
the national government did not produce commensurate disen-
chantment at lower levels. Alternatively, the factors feeding the
growing distrust of the federal government did not have as much
impact at the lower levels.197
Although the lack of survey research in the early twentieth century
prevents comparison of these data with data from the Progressive Era
and the Great Depression, current reevaluations of government ap-
pear to be the mirror image of those that occurred during these prior
eras.
In the early nineteenth century, individuals looked to state and
local government for the services they expected the government to
provide.198 Charges of corruption as well as changing expectations
produced dissatisfaction with the performance of those governments.
The perceived incapacity of state governments to cope with national
problems grew as the economy nationalized and reached a high water
mark when the country slipped into the Great Depression.199 In a tre-
mendous wave of legislative activity, the federal government took on
the responsibility of constructing government programs to move the
economy forward.200 The two successful wars that bracketed the Great
Depression undoubtedly contributed to a belief in the competence of
the federal government.201 The public turned to the federal govern-
197. Id.
198. Fire fighting, police, public education, sewage disposal, and road and bridge mainte-
nance have been local activities historically. Before the rise of economic regulation and redis-
tributive programs, these activities constituted the vast bulk of what people expected from their
government.
199. During the Great Depression, state and local governments were capable of stop-gap
measures, such as Minnesota Governor Floyd Olson’s moratorium on mortgage foreclosures,
but the country despaired of the political process’s inability to cope with the country’s economic
ills until President Roosevelt assumed office and inspired new confidence in the nation. See
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932–1940, at
47 (1963) (“Two weeks after Roosevelt took office, the country seemed a changed place. Where
once there had been apathy and despondency, there was now an immense sense of move-
ment.”).
200. See id. at 41–62 (describing legislation in President Roosevelt’s first hundred days).
201. The immediate aftermath of World War II brought a prosperity that removed much of
the justification for New Deal interventions in the economy. The period saw the dismantling of
a number of New Deal programs. See ALAN BRINKLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
94, 97 (1998) (“To them the end of the Depression removed whatever justification there had
been for the New Deal interventions into the economy and mandated a return to a less regu-
lated market, a less profligate government, and a less expansive welfare state.”). However, when
Keynesian economics soon called for the use of fiscal tools to promote economic prosperity, and
when the war on poverty and then the environmental and consumer movements later called for
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ment during the first half of the century because the federal govern-
ment registered well on each of the elements of trust: encapsulated
interest, competence, and costs.202
Because state governments appear to have fared better than the
federal government on the elements of encapsulated interest, compe-
tence, and costs, they have become more attractive options for the
trust that is being withdrawn from the federal government. This shift
in trust has manifested itself politically in a desire to remove power
from the federal government and give it to the states.203 Part V of this
Essay proposes a causal connection between distrust of the federal
government and the Court’s federalism jurisprudence.
V.  TRUST AND FEDERALISM DOCTRINES
A lack of trust in the federal government provides a reason to be
unenthusiastic about granting the federal government more deci-
sionmaking authority and provides a reason to cut back on the
authority the federal government already has. One link between the
decline in trust in the federal government and political decisions allo-
cating authority to the states is thus a propositional, or reason-giving
one. This propositional link is not the only link between these two,
however. In addition to the reasons people make decisions, cognitive
psychologists stress how affective or attitudinal elements also play a
government response, federal programs proliferated because “the New Deal conception of the
state—a national government actively prepared to take on whatever functions seemed necessary
to ensure economic prosperity—[had become] an accepted fact.” Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1263–64 (1986).
202. This analysis is consistent with the revival of trust in the federal government that has
occurred since the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked on September 11, 2001.
See supra note 191. When it comes to providing for the national defense, citizens have confi-
dence that the interests of elected officials coincide with their own. Officials reinforce this sense
of shared interest through statements proclaiming that partisanship is being put aside in favor of
bipartisan support for the president. Under such circumstances, citizens trust the federal gov-
ernment because they strongly believe that the interest in national defense is an encapsulated
interest. The Vietnam War notwithstanding, citizens also have confidence in the competence of
the American armed forces. (In fact, the failure in Vietnam is often portrayed as a failure by
politicians to permit American troops to employ all of the tools at their disposal.) In the wake of
the terrorist attacks, therefore, Americans’ faith in the competence of the federal government is
also strong. Finally, the costs of not reposing trust in the only governmental body with the ca-
pacity and legal authority to provide for the national defense appear to be extremely high. Al-
though trust in the federal government has risen since the terrorist attacks, it is too early to say
whether this confidence in the federal government to defend the nation will carry over to im-
prove confidence in the government with respect to domestic programs. For further discussion,
see infra note 232.
203. See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
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role in their thinking and reasoning. Psychologists now believe that
people formulate favorable or unfavorable judgments about objects
of their attention that are subsequently stored in their memories as an
evaluative or affective “tag.”204 Subsequently, the “very same mecha-
nism that brings thoughts into consideration also carries the affective
coloration of these thoughts to mind.”205
The propositional, or reason-giving, role of trust has special sig-
nificance to the theory of judicial decisionmaking employed in exter-
nalist models. Under the externalist view, judges decide cases so as to
satisfy their preferences. Their distrust of the federal government
contributes to their decision by providing them with a reason to pre-
fer limitations on federal power.
The affective role of trust has special significance in internalist
theories of judicial decisionmaking. The negative impression of the
federal government produced by sustained periods of distrust can tag
the idea of federal authority with a negative or hostile affect. That
negative tag subsequently influences judicial reasoning in cases about
federal authority, not by giving judges reasons for deciding against
federal power, but by influencing what kinds of arguments judges find
most persuasive.
The theory of reasoning that posits these connections is known as
the theory of motivated reasoning. It states that when individuals
have a “wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a
given reasoning task,” this motivation “may affect reasoning through
reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for access-
ing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs” by providing a “directional
goal” for their reasoning processes.206 That directional goal influences
the results of the reasoning process because people draw on an exist-
ing supply of beliefs, evaluation techniques, and inference rules when
confronted with a problem.207 At any one time, they do not draw on
their entire supply of beliefs, techniques, and rules. In fact “people
204. See, e.g., Milton Lodge & Charles Taber, Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated
Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE AND THE BOUNDS OF
RATIONALITY 183, 183–86 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (describing the theory of cognition in
which all social concepts are affect-laden and in which the affects associated with social concepts
are “stored directly with the concept in long-term memory”).
205. Id. at 196.
206. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990).
207. See id. (“[This] discussion is restricted to cases in which motivation can be construed as
affecting the process of reasoning: forming impressions, determining one’s beliefs and attitudes,
evaluating evidence, and making decisions.”).
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access different beliefs and rules on different occasions: They endorse
different attitudes, express different self-concepts, make different so-
cial judgments, and use different statistical rules.”208
The theory of motivated reasoning posits that directional goals
regarding the outcome of the reasoning process are among the condi-
tions that influence the beliefs, rules, evaluations, and explanations
that people employ and find persuasive.209 A growing body of evi-
dence supports this theory.210 For instance, in one study women who
consumed large amounts of caffeine were less convinced by an article
claiming that caffeine posed risks for women than were women who
consumed small amounts of caffeine.211 Men, who one would expect to
have less of a directional goal with respect to the evaluation of the ar-
ticle than women, showed no such differential effects.212 Similarly,
those who believed that capital punishment deters crime were more
likely to criticize a disconfirming study on the basis of “insufficient
sample size, nonrandom sample selection, or absence of control for
important variables” than were those who thought that capital pun-
ishment was not a deterrent.213 In short, “[p]eople are more likely to
arrive at those conclusions that they want to arrive at.”214
Motivated reasoning does not mean that “anything goes” as long
as it leads to the desired conclusion.215 “[W]e are not at liberty to con-
clude whatever we want to conclude simply because we want to. Even
when we are motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion, we are
also motivated to be rational and to construct a justification for our
desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer.”216
208. Id. at 483 (citations omitted).
209. See id. (“The proposed mechanisms are based on the assumption that directional goals
may influence which beliefs and rules are accessed and applied on a given occasion.”).
210. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 212–35 (1999) (summarizing evidence that mo-
tivated reasoning theory is superior to a purely cognitive account of reasoning).
211. See Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal
Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636, 642–44 (1987) (“Thus it appears that those
subjects who stood to suffer personal implications if the evidence were true were more likely to
doubt its truth.”).
212. Id.
213. Kunda, supra note 206, at 490 (citing C.G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979)).
214. Id. at 495.
215. See id. at 486 (“[M]otivated self-characterizations often appear to be constrained by
prior self-knowledge, and these constraints provide indirect evidence that motivation biases self-
conceptions by biasing the memory search for relevant information.”).
216. KUNDA, supra note 210, at 224.
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As Ziva Kunda observes, “[We] are constrained by [our] prior beliefs
about the acceptability of various procedures.”217
The influence of directional goals, furthermore, seems to be less-
ened when the subject expects that others will evaluate the results of
his reasoning. Subjects who expected to be evaluated or who ex-
pected their judgments to be made public relied less on the cognitive
biases that are thought to lead to less defensible judgments, such as
stereotyping, anchoring when making probability judgments, or ex-
cessively attributing causality to individuals despite the presence of
environmental constraints.218 On the other hand, directional goals
tend to be influential when the issue to be analyzed is complex or
when the reasoner possesses a rich body of knowledge; “it is sophisti-
cates who typically hold the strongest attitudes, with the most confi-
dence, and who have the most facts at hand, thereby making them
more able to assimilate supporting evidence and better equipped to
discredit arguments that challenge their established beliefs or atti-
tudes.”219
Judicial reasoning appears to exhibit an interesting constellation
of features, many diminishing or increasing the influence of direc-
tional goals on judges’ reasoning processes.220 On the one hand, judges
expect their opinions to be evaluated. In the case of the Supreme
Court, that review process occurs mostly outside the judiciary, at the
hands of elected officials, the public, and the scholarly community.
Public scrutiny generally is thought to affect judicial behavior, how-
ever. On the other hand, the materials, evaluation techniques, and in-
ferential rules of constitutional reasoning are rich, and judges are so-
phisticated in deploying them. Judges can invoke arguments based on
originalist understandings of the Founding, including the early Con-
217. Kunda, supra note 206, at 490.
218. See id. at 481 (citing studies).
219. Lodge & Taber, supra note 204, at 211.
220. Little empirical work has tested the general applicability of these findings to judges.
There has been work, however, on the susceptibility of judges to a set of cognitive illusions that
have been studied extensively outside of the judicial context. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski,
and Andrew Wistrich have studied whether judicial reasoning showed the effects of anchoring,
framing, the hindsight bias, the egocentric bias, and the representative heuristic. “Although the
judges in our study appeared somewhat less susceptible to two of these illusions (framing effects
and the representative heuristic) than lay decision makers . . . each of the five illusions . . . had a
significant impact on judicial decision making. Judges, it seems, are human.” Chris Guthrie, Jef-
frey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778
(2001). As humans, judges should show the effects of motivated reasoning (which also has been
studied extensively on lay decisionmakers. See infra notes 229–38 and accompanying text.).
SCHROEDER.DOC 02/07/02 11:44 AM
2001] CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 355
gresses,221 analogical reasoning,222 sources incorporated by reference,223
historical tradition,224 the implicit premises underlying the Constitu-
tion,225 and claims of special status for suspect classes or fundamental
interests,226 among others.227
This Essay will not attempt to develop a full-blown theory of
constitutional reasoning. Any adequate theory will support the con-
clusion that many constitutional questions do not have inevitable an-
swers. Diverse formulations of judicial reasoning, stressing different
argument types, making different evaluations of evidence, and draw-
ing different inferences from available legal materials—all within the
range of professional respectability—can lead to different conclu-
sions. Even if lines of argument, once adopted, constrain subsequent
judgments through the requirements of plausible consistency (a nec-
essary element of any respectable system of legal reasoning purport-
ing to uphold the rule of law),228 the initial process of reasoning was
less constrained.
221. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) (rejecting any role for Congress in
the removal of executive officers on the basis of debates on the subject in the First Congress).
222. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 897 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (analo-
gizing the resolution of a jurisdictional issue for an Article I court to the resolution of a similar
issue in an Article III context).
223. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 154 (1973) (relying upon an understanding of
the common law at the time of the Framers to interpret the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of
a jury trial).
224. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (relying upon the history
and tradition of the country to establish the contours of a due process right).
225. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (relying upon state sovereignty as a
background condition for ratification of the Constitution to bar the federal government from
subjecting a state government to suit in state court without state waiver of sovereign immunity).
226. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding that
strict scrutiny must be applied to all government programs involving racial classifications).
227. Various scholars have attempted to catalogue permissible types of legal or constitu-
tional arguments. Philip Bobbitt, for example, identifies six types: historical, textual, structural,
doctrinal, ethical, and prudential. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13
(1991).
228. See id. at 119:
The claim is usually that we (or a judge) must know when to accept or reject a par-
ticular argument according to a comprehensive, consistent rule; that this is the only
way that we can apply the law rather than our personal preferences; if we have no
such rule, then the claim that we are acting from motives other than our preferences
is a sham, and the respect due to our decisions—the legitimacy they enjoy—should be
withdrawn.
See also Tom Grey, The New Formalism, Working Paper No. 4, Stanford Public Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper Series (1999), at 1–5, at http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.taf?abstract_id=
200732 (last visited Sept. 1, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (defining rule of law val-
ues as determinacy, fidelity, and transparency, which together place a premium on consistency).
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This general sketch of judicial reasoning can be combined with
motivated reasoning theory to construct an internalist account of the
relationship between federalism doctrines and public distrust of gov-
ernment. Justices develop opinions about the desirability of allocating
decisionmaking authority to various levels of government, just as
other citizens do. These opinions are linked as negative affective tags
to concepts of federal authority and centralized power, among others.
When these cognitive concepts and their associated tags are activated,
as when a federalism dispute comes before the Court, they provide
directional goals in a process of motivated judicial reasoning, which
tends to draw upon beliefs, techniques, and inferential rules support-
ing the desired conclusion. The influence of those prior evaluations
does not function as an external preference that Justices attempt to
satisfy strategically. Instead, their influence operates internally to the
reasoning process, conditioning the beliefs, arguments, and evidence
the Justices find persuasive.
Externalists see a direct strategic connection between judicial
policy preferences and judicial decisions. Traditional internalists as-
sert that judges are able to resist allowing their policy preferences to
affect outcomes. Their ideal is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, as he
described his own role. Holmes once wrote to Harold Laski about a
case involving a federal statute. “I hope and believe,” he wrote, “that
I am not influenced by my opinion that it is a foolish law. I have little
doubt that the country likes it and I always say, as you know, that if
my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.”229
The theory of motivated reasoning, though, suggests that there is a
third explanation for how judges think: judges may be successful, at
least some of the time, in preventing their policy preferences from
serving as the conscious objective of their decisionmaking, and yet
those “private” preferences can provide directional goals that affect
the arguments and evidence judges find persuasive.
I know of no empirical studies testing this theory directly on legal
reasoning.230 I believe, however, that any lawyer who has litigated a
case at some time has had an experience that speaks to the explana-
tory power of motivated reasoning. Lawyers are trained to advocate
229. Oliver W. Holmes, Letter from Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI, 1916–1935, at 248–49 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
230. But see supra note 220 (describing a study on the susceptibility of judges to a set of cog-
nitive illusions that have been studied outside the judicial context).
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vigorously for their clients, a task that involves presenting the best le-
gal arguments to advance their clients’ interests. Finding the best ar-
gument for a client does not mean, of course, that one has found the
best argument in the case—the best argument of the other side might
be better. This is not, however, how lawyers experience the process of
analyzing facts, researching arguments, testing theories, and devel-
oping their eventual legal position. Because lawyers are motivated to
find persuasive arguments to support their clients’ positions, the the-
ory of motivated reasoning suggests that they will find arguments,
evaluative techniques, and evidence that vindicate their clients’ posi-
tions to be the most persuasive.231 More often than not, lawyers be-
come convinced not only that they have found the best argument for
their side, but that their argument is superior to the other side’s ar-
gument.
The theory of motivated reasoning, then, proposes that Justices’
opinions about the trustworthiness of the federal government will
provide them with a directional goal that influences what elements of
judicial reasoning they will select (in other words, find persuasive) in
reaching federalism decisions.232 They will be constrained by the
231. This hypothesis could be tested. Through some appropriate screening, a person could
compile a list of litigated cases in which the ex ante probabilities of prevailing were approxi-
mately one-half for each side. The person then could question the lawyers for each side to find
out if they believed they had better legal arguments than their opponents. If the motivated rea-
soning hypothesis is correct, the percentage of both winning and losing attorneys responding
affirmatively ought to be greater than fifty percent.
232. Some analysts have suggested that the increased trust in the federal government in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon may
alter the course of the Court’s federalism decisions by encouraging the Justices to permit more
expansive federal powers. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Author-
ity?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, § 4, at 14. While it is too early to tell whether this will be true,
the analysis developed in this Essay suggests several preliminary conclusions. First, the increase
in confidence in the federal government is entirely consistent with the Essay’s hypothesis. Ap-
plication of the three elements of trust to post–September 11 events explains why a revival of
trust has occurred. See supra note 202. Second, whether the current revival of trust will affect
judicial thinking about federalism will depend in the first instance on whether the revival is
lasting. Although this Essay has not emphasized this point, positive regard for the federal gov-
ernment may need to exist for many years before it influences the internal thought processes of
sitting Justices. Robert Putnam has suggested that “there is a real chance that at least a portion
of the recent gains in public confidence and civic engagement can be retained, but only if politi-
cal leaders, civic and religious groups work quickly to harness the current wave of good feelings
sweeping the country.” Morin & Deane, supra note 191. By comparison, this Essay has pointed
to a roughly thirty-year period in which negative regard for the federal government was a
prevalent feature of public discourse. See supra Part IV. Third, even assuming that trust in the
federal government remains strong for many years, whether this increased trust will have an ef-
fect on federal decisionmaking on domestic matters will depend upon whether people draw a
distinction between national defense–related trust and trust related to domestic matters. This
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bounds of professional acceptability. Arguments based on doctrine,
precedent, original understanding, and other tools of judicial reason-
ing and interpretation delineate the possible avenues of decision. The
Justices’ directional goals make some of those avenues more attrac-
tive, thereby influencing the ultimate destination.
The role of legal reasoning in the judicial process is similar to the
role of ideas in the political process, as described by Max Weber:
“Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s
conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been cre-
ated by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along
which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest.”233 In
Weber’s case, ideas create the possibilities for action among which
individuals believe themselves free to choose. In the judicial case, ex-
isting doctrine, arguments, and settled interpretations of prior deci-
sions operate as the switchmen determining which tracks the reason-
ing process can most readily follow. However well specified these
doctrinal tracks become, they still may lead to multiple destinations.
Morrison234 and Lopez,235 for instance, depend significantly on a his-
torical recognition that the Commerce Clause power does not grant a
general police power to the federal government.236 There must be
some regulatory space that can be reached only by state authority.
Morrison and Lopez maintain that a dividing line exists between
commercial and noncommercial activities.237 The precise contours of
that boundary are scarcely well-defined, however, and it will take the
Essay’s analysis suggests that such a distinction could be drawn. For instance, even if the events
of September 11, 2001, increase confidence in all levels of government, there still will be less
cost in cabining federal power over domestic issues compared to cabining federal power over
national defense. See Ernest Young, The Balance of Federalism in Unbalanced Times: Should
the Supreme Court Reconsider Its Federalism Precedents in Light of the War on Terrorism?, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011010_young.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the Court should continue to follow the course of
its most recent federalism decisions).
233. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGY 280 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds., 1958).
234. Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
235. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995).
236. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (relying on the review of the Commerce Clause’s history
in Lopez for the proposition that limits to the commerce power always have been recognized);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (noting that the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
“acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the
Commerce Clause”).
237. See Morrsion, 529 U.S. at 610–11 (emphasizing the commercial nature of activities that
legitimately can be regulated); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 559–60 (same).
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rendering of many more decisions involving diverse fact situations to
flesh out its meaning.238 Under the theory offered here, a majority of
the Court has begun to try to articulate a formal dividing line between
what is local and what is federal for Commerce Clause purposes. The
fact that four Justices strongly favor getting off the tracks the Court
majority has chosen shows that the account given here is not a deter-
ministic one. It presents an argument as to why the shift in favor of
the states seems more reasonable now than it would have thirty years
ago. A number of alternative doctrinal tracks remain open. This Es-
say has suggested that part of the explanation for why new doctrinal
directions are being explored is that thirty years of distrust of the fed-
eral government have made more attractive the paths of decision-
making that lead to a reallocation of government power.
CONCLUSION
In discussing the causal role of political ideas, Geoffrey Garrett
and Barry Weingast argue that ideas “are a dime a dozen.”239 “For
every idea that appears to play a major role in politics, tens of thou-
sands play no role at all. Rarely do scholars explain why the idea they
study had an impact when so many others did not.”240 Additionally,
they argue that “too often an argument about the role of ideas
amounts to an assertion that an idea mattered without a persuasive
explanation for why or how it had influence.”241
The theory of motivated reasoning provides an explanation for
how ideas about trust and distrust of government may have influ-
enced the recent federalism cases. Those ideas do not enter the pic-
ture as policy preferences the judges consciously pursue, but rather as
internal influences upon the reasoning process of the Justices.
238. Subsequent decisions have not shed much light on the distinction. The Court has inti-
mated that the Commerce Clause does not extend federal authority to the regulation of non-
navigable, isolated, intrastate waters, but did so in a way that did not further elucidate the
meaning of “commercial.” See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (“We thus decline . . . [to hold] that isolated ponds, some only seasonal,
wholly located within two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)’s definition of ‘navigable waters’
because they serve as habitat for migratory birds.”).
239. Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing
the European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (Judith Gold-
stein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
240. Id. at 203.
241. Id.
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This account provides an explanation for the perceived correla-
tion between judicial decisions and presumed judicial policy prefer-
ences while at the same time preserving a defensible version of the in-
ternalist account of judicial decisionmaking. Although the application
of motivated reasoning to judicial decisionmaking requires further re-
finement, it at least provides a plausible causal connection between
attitudes toward government and the recent federalism decisions.
As for Garrett and Weingast’s first question (why does any par-
ticular idea have an impact?), the presence of a large, centralized, and
active federal government since World War II would seem to make
the public’s attitudes toward the capabilities, motivating interests, and
costs of relying upon the federal government loom large. Many peo-
ple have developed a bias against the national government. Deciding
where decisionmaking authority should lie is the predominant func-
tion of constitutional adjudication in general, and federalism adjudi-
cation in particular.242 Accordingly, an evaluation of the trustworthi-
ness of the federal government that assigns a negative connotation to
enlargements of federal power ought to produce a directional goal
capable of influencing the reasoning process of elected officials, the
general public, and even judges.
This Essay has not attempted to evaluate its theory in compari-
son to other possible explanations for the federalism decisions; in-
stead it simply has stated the theory and explained why it makes
sense. I have argued that the theory has certain advantages over ei-
ther the internal or external account taken alone. Nonetheless, other
explanations may be better. The Court may be making a blatant grab
for power, in which the conservative Justices strategically advance
their policy preferences. Bush v. Gore243 supports that interpretation;
the same five-Justice majority responsible for the federalism changes
may have effectively handed the presidential election to George W.
Bush by stopping the recount in Florida. It has been claimed that
these five Justices effectuated a “constitutional coup,” seeking to se-
cure their jurisprudential legacy through further strategic appoint-
ments by a Republican president.244
242. See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.
243. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
244. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 88, at 1050 (referring to Bush v. Gore as a con-
stitutional coup); Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup, LONDON REV. OF
BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3 (same).
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Matters of no small significance hang on which interpretation
better describes events. Indeed, should the constitutional coup picture
be the truer one, and should we move into a period that solidifies and
extends the Court’s recent federalism changes, those changes not only
would fail to satisfy Ackerman’s four-step road to nontextual legiti-
macy, they also would be illegitimate under almost any other theory.
On the other hand, should the motivated reasoning account be the
better one, the recent turn in constitutional interpretation may ac-
quire a greater claim to legitimacy. Unfortunately, distinguishing
these two possibilities would require access to the internal thought
processes of the Justices, which is unlikely. The interpretive battle
over Bush v. Gore inevitably will be fought on terrain where moti-
vated reasoning will continue to be in evidence—in the stances taken
by advocates of either side—regardless of whether it explains the fed-
eralism decisions.
However the legitimacy question is answered, the account of-
fered here suggests that Supreme Court doctrine aligns itself with
broader political dispositions toward the allocation of decisionmaking
authority, not only through strategic appointments, but also by moti-
vated reasoning. Perhaps this explains why so much of the constitu-
tional text has remained unchanged for so long—it is a text with
enough flexibility to bend with political change.
